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We analyze two pricing mechanisms for information goods – selling, where an up-front payment allows
unrestricted use by the consumer, and pay per-use pricing where the payments are tailored to the consumer’s
usage patterns. We analytically model these pricing mechanisms in a market where consumers differ in
terms of usage frequency and utility-per-use. When a monopolist employs each mechanism independently, we
demonstrate that pay-per-use pricing generally yields higher profits than selling, provided the transaction cost
associated with the former is not too high. We then show that pay-per-use yields higher profits than selling
when usage frequency is uncertain, whereas selling yields higher profits when utility-per-use is uncertain. We
then analyze a duopoly and demonstrate that, in the only non-zero pricing equilibrium, one duopolist employs
selling and the other employs pay-per-use. Here, the findings from the monopoly case are reversed and selling
always yields higher profits than pay-per-use. Further, we demonstrate that as the transaction cost associated
with pay-per-use increases, the profits of both duopolists can increase. If an upgrade is to be offered later, we
show that if consumers are myopic, the pay-per-use mechanism performs better in a monopoly, and selling
performs better in a duopoly. Finally, we model the scenario where competing, vertically differentiated firms
can choose endogenously between the two pricing mechanisms and demonstrate how the firms move from
each offering both mechanisms when the transaction cost associated with pay-per-use is low to each offering
only selling when this cost is very high.
Key words : information goods, competitive strategy, pricing mechanisms
History :
1. Introduction
Advances in network technology have enhanced the popularity of “pay-per-use” pricing for infor-
mation goods (Altinkemer and Tomak 2001, Choudhary et al. 1998). With the rapid growth of
Cloud-based computing and information management,the pay-per-use model is now increasingly
being applied across usage settings including gaming and movies (Altinkemer and Bandyopadhyay
2000, Krause 2004, Machrone 2006), data plans (Chavez 2011), information storage (Clark 2011),
monetary transactions (Reeve 2011), teleconferencing (McKnight and Boroumand 2000), billing
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2services, software applications such as Salesforce.com that now allow payment on a “per-login”
basis, and Computer Aided Design (CAD) suites (Machine Design 2000). In this paper, we analyze
the performance of conventional selling (i.e., unlimited-use pricing) and pay-per-use mechanisms
for information-intensive goods in monopoly and duopoly contexts.
Pricing has been described as the moment of truth in the marketing context (Corey 1991), and
is sensitive to consumer usage patterns and heterogeneity (Chen et al. 2001). Independent of how
much value the company has created for customers, a bad pricing decision can lower profits either
because the company tries to extract too much value back from the customer, or because the
company leaves too much value on the table for the customer. In particular, when it comes to
information goods, pay-per-use and other technology-intensive pricing strategies can play a key
role in enhancing the value delivered to the customer, in facilitating better extraction of created
value, and ultimately, in altering the competitive landscape (Nault and Dexter 1995).
To motivate the theoretical development, consider the application of pay-per-use pricing in the
engineering design industry. Altair Engineering’s Hyperworks On-Demand is a computer-aided
engineering (CAE) simulation software platform that is applied by clients to create virtual models
that can aid structural optimization (Roush 2011), and the study of fluid-structure interaction
and multi-body dynamics (e.g., collisions between “virtual” cars). Under a “pay-per-usage” license
model, customers purchase HyperWorks “units” which are used to pay for the metered use of a
suite of HyperWorks products that are hosted in the Cloud. Altair highlights four key benefits of
the pay-per-use pricing model: (a) Flexibility – the client can avoid scaling up or scaling down
any hardware capacity in response to demand peaks and valleys; (b) Efficiency – the hardware
capabilities and solutions employed by Altair will handle workloads better that a typical client’s
in-house infrastructure; (c) Accessibility – the client can access the platform from any physical
location; and (d) Security – each client’s data is safely partitioned and stored in the Cloud.
In contrast to renting or leasing, which typically confer complete usage rights on the consumer
for a limited temporal period, pay-per-use tightly links the consumer’s usage patterns to payment
(Altman and Chu 2001). This makes pay-per-use more appealing than selling to consumers with
low usage frequencies (Nicolle 2002). Despite this benefit, there is an ongoing debate about the
relative advantages of pay-per-use pricing compared to selling (Bonasia 2007). We demonstrate
how the strength of each mechanism varies as a function of consumers’ utility-per-use and usage
frequency, and across monopoly and duopoly contexts. Our analysis contributes to the literature
and practice by addressing the following questions, among others: How do conventional selling and
pay-per-use pricing perform in markets where consumers differ in terms of (a) utility-per-use and
3(b) usage frequency? How do sellers and pay-per-use providers compete for such a market? How
do competing firms that offer vertically differentiated information goods endogenously choose a
pricing strategy?
Our analysis delivers several findings across monopoly and duopoly contexts. Some key findings
are briefly summarized as follows. First, consider a monopolist who chooses between selling and
pay-per-use pricing. Here, pay-per-use yields higher profits provided the transaction cost associated
with it is not too high. Further, consumer surplus is generally higher under selling; in contrast,
social surplus is higher under selling only when the transaction cost associated with pay-per-use
is low. We also study the impact of demand uncertainty in either the frequency of usage or the
utility-per-use on both mechanisms, and find that uncertainty in usage frequency favors the pay-
per-use mechanism, whereas uncertainty in utility-per-use favors the selling mechanism. If the firm
can offer upgrades later, we find that in a monopoly, the pay-per-use mechanism performs better
than the selling mechanism.
Second, we consider the case where duopolists that offer identical products can choose any one,
or both, of the pricing mechanisms. Here, we demonstrate that, in equilibrium, one firm sells the
good, and the other employs pay-per-use. Further, in contrast to the monopoly, selling strongly
outperforms pay-per-use pricing in a duopoly. An interesting finding here is that the profits of the
pay-per-use provider are inverted-U shaped with respect to the transaction costs associated with
that mechanism. We demonstrate that a higher transaction cost can reduce competitive pressure
and allow the profits of both firms to increase. If the firm can offer upgrades later, we find that in
a duopoly, selling performs better than the pay-per-use mechanism.
Following that, we consider the case where duopolists with vertically differentiated information
goods can employ either one or both mechanisms. Here, we show that the pay-per-use mechanism
makes a minor contribution to the profits of each firm but plays an important role in enhancing
the profits from selling. We also demonstrate how the equilibrium choices of pricing mechanisms
by the firms vary as a function of the transaction cost associated with the pay-per-use mechanism.
We also consider how the relative attractiveness of the pricing mechanisms is affected by other
factors, including: (a) uncertainty about consumer utility-per-use and/or usage frequency; (b) the
possibility of upgrades being offered by the firm; (c) alternative (non-uniform) distributions of these
utility dimensions; and (d) implementation and service costs encountered in enterprise contexts.
1.1. Extant Literature and Contribution
Research on renting versus selling in economics and marketing has primarily focused on the durable
goods context. The key theme here is the seller must coordinate primary and secondary markets
4to maximize profits (Bulow 1982, Desai and Purohit 1998, Shulman and Coughlan 2007). An
advantage of selling is that it can help “lock up” the market when there is a threat of competitive
entry (Bucovetsky and Chilton 1986). Similarly, in a competitive environment in the auto industry,
Desai and Purohit (1999) find that competitors do not lease all their units, but they either use a
combination of both leasing and selling, or only selling. They also find that the fraction of leasing
decreases as the manufacturer’s products become more similar, and the competition between them
increases. Finally, Purohit (1997) and Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2009) compare leasing and selling
when manufacturers have multiple competing intermediaries. We make a number of contributions to
this stream of literature. First, whereas the existing literature has considered competition between
a designated seller and a designated pay-per-use provider (Fishburn and Odlyzko 1999), we analyze
the equilibrium that involves the endogenous choice of the selling and/or pay-per-use by a pair of
competing firms. In this context, we derive a “defensive positioning” outcome – specifically, the
firm may choose pay-per-use in a monopoly, but if it expects competition, it can protect profits
by selling the good. Additionally, we demonstrate that as the transaction cost associated with
pay-per-use increases, the profits of both duopolists can increase. Second, we move beyond the
existing literature by analyzing the more general equilibrium where duopolists who offer vertically
differentiated goods can choose either or both of the pricing mechanisms. Here, we demonstrate how
the market is divided among the competing mechanisms, and show that when the transaction cost
associated with pay-per-use is: (a) at low to moderate levels, both firms employ both mechanisms;
(b) high, then the firm that offers higher quality employs both mechanisms, but the competitor
only engages in selling; and (c) very high, then both firms only sell the good.
Second, in the context of durable goods, the impact of demand uncertainty on the leasing and
selling mechanisms has been studied by Desai et al. (2007), who find that demand uncertainty
causes the producer’s inventory level to be U-shaped in the durability of the product, and leasing
causes a larger loss due to uncertainty than selling the product. We contribute to this stream of
literature by showing that demand uncertainty has different effects if the uncertainty is in the usage
frequency (in which case, the pay-per-use mechanism performs better), or in the utility-per-use (in
which case, selling performs better). The impact of upgrades has been studied by Yin et al. (2010)
in the durable goods sector, and Sankaranarayan (2007) for information goods. Yin et al. (2010)
find that frequent product upgrades are caused by the existence of electronic peer-to-peer markets,
and the interaction of these markets with the markets for retail goods. Sankaranarayan (2007)
finds that frequent new version releases of software result in lowering the developer’s profits due to
the strategic delaying of purchasing the software by consumers, and an offer by the developer of a
5warranty for new versions solves this commitment problem. Providing software as a service can also
lead to lower investments in quality in the long run compared to the case where the software is sold
under a perpetual license (Choudhary 2007). We contribute to this stream of literature by showing
that for information goods, the introduction of upgrades favors the pay-per-use mechanism in a
monopoly, and selling in a competitive environment.
A number of studies in the durable goods context has examined the choice of leasing or sell-
ing for a monopolist. Desai and Purohit (1998) find that the relative profitability of leasing and
selling hinges on the rates at which leased and sold units depreciate, and if sold units depreciate
significantly faster than leased units, then selling is the better option. If both units depreciate
at different rates, then the firm should use a combination of leasing and selling. Bhaskaran and
Gilbert (2005) find that in durable goods, a manufacturer that leases its products charges a higher
price by limiting the availability of the product in response to the availability of a complement.
Finally, Chien and Chu (2008) show that profits from selling durable goods is higher than from
leasing durable goods, as selling durable goods creates a stronger customer base using penetration
pricing.
In the study of information goods as well, selling and renting may not be mutually exclusionary –
a monopolist can optimally employ both mechanisms when consumer preferences are heterogeneous
and future upgrades are of uncertain quality (Zhang and Seidmann 2003). Similarly, Zhang and
Seidmann (2010) demonstrate that, in the presence of quality uncertainty and network effects,
the firm should offer both the selling and pay-per-use mechanisms as this increases both profits
and consumer welfare. Other studies of electronic goods pricing include pricing of online services
(Essegaier et al. 2002, Gurnani and Karlapalem 2001, Jain and Kannan 2002), and the interaction
of pricing of online goods and product customization (Dewan et al. 2003). Postmus et al. (2009)
compare selling and the pay-per-use mechanism with software development costs, and find that
pay-per-use dominates if software development is expensive, while selling dominates if development
costs are low. Sundararajan (2004) compares the selling and pay-per-use (usage based) mechanisms
in a monopoly setting and derives conditions where a combination of usage based pricing and selling
should be used. In contrast, our analyses throughout correspond to the case where consumers are
jointly differentiated in terms of both usage utility and usage frequency for information goods. Jiang
et al. (2007a) consider a similar differentiation and show that selling is optimal when consumers
have homogeneous valuations, but pay-per-use is more profitable than selling in markets with
heterogeneous consumers and low user inconvenience costs, when there is the potential of piracy
in the market. The presence of network effect also favors pay-per-use over selling. We show that if
6a monopolist wants to choose one mechanism, it should prefer pay-per-use if transaction costs are
low, and selling if transaction costs are high. If both mechanisms can be used, then pay-per-use
is used to cover a larger share of the market if transaction costs are low, and a lower share of the
market if transaction costs are high.
Overall, our research contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Our analyses throughout
correspond to the case where consumers are jointly differentiated in terms of both usage utility
and usage frequency. This approach reveals some interesting insights that are unavailable in the
literature. In a monopolistic environment, the pay-per-use mechanism performs better in a wider
variety of cases if transaction costs are low, while selling dominates in a competitive environment
even when transaction costs are low. When transaction costs are high, selling performs better than
the pay-per-use mechanism. On balance, much remains to be studied about how usage-sensitive
pricing mechanisms can create a strategic advantage (Ba and Johansson 2006). Our work takes a
step towards filling in some of the knowledge gaps.
The base model is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, the pricing mechanisms are analyzed
in both monopoly and duopoly contexts. In Section 4, we analyze competition with differentiated
goods. Model extensions and tests for robustness are presented in Section 5. We conclude with
Section 6.
2. The model
2.1. Assumptions and notation
Assumption 1 : Consumers purchase the information good, pay for it per use, or abstain from the
market after considering the benefits over a N -period horizon.
Assumption 2 : Each consumer i is characterized by the coordinate pair (θi,φi), where θi is the
expected usage frequency of consumer i in any period and φi is the associated utility-per-use.
Assumption 3 : Usage utility φ is distributed U [0, φH ] and usage frequency θ is distributed
U [0, θH ]. The upper limits of the distributions are elastic – this captures a range of market struc-
tures and consumer behaviors. For example, if θH > 1, consumers can use the good multiple times
per period. The situation where θ is distributed U [0,1] is a special case where θi represents the
probability of use in a given period.
Assumption 4 : Consumers using pay-per-use incur a transaction cost T per usage occasion. This
cost reflects the disutility from the repeated administrative and transaction costs associated with
pay-per-use pricing (Varian 2000, Cheng et al. 2003). For example, to play a game from an online
site, the consumer may need to first establish some authentication. The transaction cost could
7also capture the “ticking meter” effect that results when payment is tightly linked to consumption
(Train 1991). When usage experiences in the pay-per-use and selling mechanisms converge, T=0.
Assumption 5 : Reflecting a perfect capital market, the discount factor for future utility, δ, is the
same for the firm and consumers.
Assumption 6 : The information good can be reproduced and delivered at negligible marginal cost.
Further, we ignore fixed costs because they do not directly impinge on optimal pricing decisions.
Further, we consider a horizon of N periods. The total consumer utility over this horizon is
obtained by multiplying the expected utility per period and D, the NPV factor over N periods
which is defined as follows:
D= 1 + δ+ δ2 + δ3 + ...+ δN−1 = 1−δ
N
1−δ
We will selectively relax some assumptions later to model specific market contexts. Throughout
the paper, subscript S denotes a variable pertaining to the seller and subscript O denotes a variable
corresponding to the pay-per-use provider. Hence, pS denotes the selling price associated with the
selling mechanism, MSS and ΠS respectively denote the market share and profits from selling, and
UiS denotes the consumer utility from buying the good. Similarly, pO, MSO, and ΠO denote the
payment-per-use, market share and profits related to the pay-per-use mechanism, and UiO denotes
the consumer utility surplus from that mechanism.
2.2. Model setup
Consumer i will find pay-per-use pricing feasible only when φi − T ≥ pO.This participation con-
straint requires the net per-use utility to be greater than the payment per-use pO. Similarly,
consumer i will find buying feasible only when θiφiD≥ pS. Here, the left hand side represents the
(expected) discounted utility consumer i gains from using the good through N periods. This utility
must be greater than the purchase price for buying to be feasible. The surplus gained by consumer
i under each pricing mechanism is:
Pay-per-use: UiO(pO) = θi(φi−T − pO)D (1)
Selling: UiS(pS) = θiφiD−pS (2)
In computing the surplus under pay-per-use, payments are made with a usage frequency of θi in
each period because the per-use payments are tightly linked to realized usage. In contrast, under
selling, the upfront price pS is directly subtracted from the consumer’s utility with no discounting.
Figure 1 displays the market shares of the mechanisms when each is independently used by the
monopolist. If the monopolist only offers pay-per-use, all consumers with φi > pO + T potentially
use the good. Accordingly, the market share is φH−(pO+T )
φH
. The average frequency of use of the pay-
per-use usage mechanism in each period is θH
2
. Therefore, the expected profits under pay-per-use
8Figure 1 Market shares for pay-per-use pricing and selling
φΗ
θH0
Pay-per-use
fraction
Uncovered
market
pO
pO+T
φΗ
θH0
Uncovered
market
pS=θφD
Buying
fraction
are:
ΠO(pO) =
φH−(pO+T )
φH
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2
pOD (3)
If the firm sells the good, all consumers with usage frequencies in the range θ ∈ [ pS
φD
, θH ] derive
(weakly) positive utility from buying the good. The market share of the seller and the resulting
profits are, respectively:
MSS(pS) =
1
φHθH
∫ φH
φ=
pS
θHD
[θH − pSφD ]dφ= 1φHθH [θHφH −
pS
D
+ pS
D
log( pS
θHφHD
)]
ΠS(pS) =MSS(pS)pS =
pS
φHθH
[θHφH − pSD + pSD log( pSθHφHD )] (4)
The model provides a parsimonious and flexible representation of selling and pay-per-use mech-
anisms.
3. Pricing in monopoly and duopoly contexts
3.1. Monopoly
We first analyze the separate use of each mechanism by a monopolist. The results are tabulated in
Table 1 (see Appendix A1 for proof).
Pay-per-use Selling
Payment per use/Selling price pO =
φH−T
2
pS = 0.285θHφHD
Market share MSO =
φH−T
2φH
MSS = 0.358
Profits 1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
D 0.1018θHφHD
Consumer Surplus 1
16
θH (φH−T )2
φH
D 0.0769θHφHD
Social Welfare 3
16
θH (φH−T )2
φH
D 0.1787θHφHD
Table 1: Optimal outcomes in a monopoly
Proposition 1: If the monopolist uses only pay-per-use pricing or selling, the profits from pay-
per-use pricing are higher than those from selling if T < 0.0976φH . The net consumer surplus is
9always higher under selling, but the total social welfare under pay-per-use is higher than that under
selling if T < 0.0237φH .
A monopolist prefers pay-per-use when T is low, consistent with Sundararajan (2004). Intuitively,
pay-per-use perfectly discriminates among consumers in terms of usage frequency. This is because,
if the total cost per use – the sum of pO and T – is lower than the utility-per-use, consumers will
use the product on every occasion that they need to. This total cost is low when T is low, thereby
increasing market share and profits. In contrast, under selling, forward-looking consumers make
purchase decisions by comparing their total utility across time – this depends on both utility-per-
use and usage frequency – to the selling price. Therefore, selling is relatively more attractive than
pay-per-use for consumers with a low per-use utility but a high usage frequency (see Figure 1). The
level of T decides which of these contrasting benefits translate into higher profits. Another insight
is that, because the per-use payment is set to maximize profits on a period-by-period basis, the
optimal per-use payment and corresponding market share are independent of the usage frequency
and the NPV factor D (see Table 1).
Consumers have a higher net surplus under selling because, unlike pay-per-use, the firm that
sells cannot discriminate perfectly along the usage frequency dimension. Interestingly, even when
T = 0,the net consumer surplus under pay-per-use is lower than that under selling. However, the
increased profitability from pay-per-use ensures that for very low transaction costs (T < 0.0237φH),
the social welfare under pay-per-use is higher than under selling.
We extend these findings in two directions. First, consider the case where the monopolist jointly
offers both mechanisms. Here, only consumers with usage frequency higher than a certain critical
frequency given by θc =
pS
(pO+T )D
will buy the good, and others will prefer pay-per-use. We demon-
strate that the monopolist employs only pay-per-use when T = 0, and only selling as T approaches
φH . For intermediate levels of T , the monopolist employs both mechanisms. The role of pay-per-use
in generating profits decreases as T increases (see Electronic Appendix 1 for proof).
Second, consider the case where the good has positive marginal costs, possibly due to some
material content. We demonstrate that such costs decrease profits more sharply from pay-per-use
than from selling. Intuitively, under selling, there is a dedicated unit variable cost allocated to
each consumer who buys the good. In contrast, the allocation of supply to demand is more finely
controlled under pay-per-use. For example, as noted by Varian (2000), the same DVD at a rental
outlet can be shared by different consumers at different points of time – therefore, variable costs can
be allocated across a wider consumer base. Such “resource pooling” enhances profits (see Electronic
Appendix 2 for proof).
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Moving forward from the “base case,” we now examine how uncertainty in usage frequency and
utility-per-use affect the performance of these mechanisms.
3.2. Uncertainty in usage frequency and utility-per-use
In this section, we consider the impact of uncertainty in the usage frequency and utility-per-use
separately first, and then jointly. In the case where only the usage frequency is uncertain, let the
usage frequency be distributed U [0, θH + v] with probability 0.5, and U [0, θH − v] with probability
0.5 (as before, utility-per-use is distributed U [0, φH ]). Similarly, in the case where only the utility-
per-use is uncertain, let the utility-per-use be distributed U [0, φH + v] with probability 0.5, and
U [0, φH − v] with probability 0.5 (the usage frequency is distributed U [0, θH ]). We can show that
any other binary probability combinations will not affect our findings. Here, v captures the degree of
uncertainty, and v= 0 implies the absence of uncertainty. We find that (see Electronic Appendices
3A and 3B for proof):
Proposition 2: (i) If the usage frequency is uncertain, the cut-off transaction cost below which
pay-per-use is more profitable than selling is higher than in absence of uncertainty.
(ii) If the utility-per-use is uncertain, the cut-off transaction cost below which pay-per-use is more
profitable than selling is lower than in the absence of uncertainty.
Effectively, uncertainty in usage frequency increases the relative attractiveness of the pay-per-use
mechanism. Recall that, under pay-per-use, a consumer pays for the good contingent on usage.
If consumers use the information good more or less frequently compared to the expected usage
frequency, the (risk neutral) firm still performs as well on average with the payment-per-use set
at the same level as in the case with no uncertainty. That is, there is no efficiency loss from such
uncertainty. In contrast, under selling, if the firm persists with same selling price as in the case
without uncertainty, then it loses market share if the actual distribution of usage frequency is at
the high end, and loses margin if that distribution is at the low end. Hence, the firm prices lower
under such uncertainty, reducing its profits.
In contrast, the expected profits under both mechanisms decrease when utility-per-use is uncer-
tain, but profits under pay-per-use decrease more sharply. Therefore, such uncertainty increases
the attractiveness of selling. The intuition is as follows. When the firm employs pay-per-use, its
market share is driven solely by utility-per-use because pay-per-use discriminates perfectly across
consumers in terms of usage frequency. Uncertainty regarding utility-per-use lowers the market
share under pay-per-use sharply because the firm is forced to choose a substantially lower payment-
per-use that can reasonably accommodate both the possible scenarios. On the other hand, selling is
less affected because the usage frequency, which plays a role in the construction of consumer utility
11
when evaluating the pricing mechanism, is known to the firm. Therefore, uncertainty along the
usage frequency and utility-per-use dimensions have distinct implications for each pricing mecha-
nism.
Next, consider the case where there is uncertainty in both usage frequency and utility-per-use.
We find that dual uncertainty lowers profits under pay-per-use to a lesser extent than under selling
(see Electronic Appendix 3C for a numerical analysis). This is because pay-per-use is negatively
affected only by uncertainty in utility-per-use whereas selling is negatively affected by both sources
of uncertainty.
3.3. Duopoly with undifferentiated information goods
Consider a duopoly where each firm can employ either selling or pay-per-use, or both mechanisms.
We model this game in two stages, where each firm chooses their mechanisms in the first stage, and
then given their choice of mechanisms, they choose their prices in the second stage (Coughlan 1985,
Gupta and Loulou 1998). Each firm’s good offers utility-per-use φ to consumers, and consumers
have the same usage frequency θ for both products. Result 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcome
for the channel choice game (see Electronic Appendix 4 for proof):
Result 1: Consider a duopoly with undifferentiated information goods. In the corresponding
Nash equilibrium, one firm employs selling and the other employs pay-per-use. There exists no
Nash equilibrium with positive firm profits where either firm employs both mechanisms, or both
firms employ the same mechanism.
If both firms employ the same mechanism, they compete themselves down to zero profits. Each
firm can lower its selling price or the payment-per-use to undercut the other – this cycle of under-
cutting will lead to a zero-profit outcome.
Recall that the utility surpluses related to pay-per-use pricing and buying are described in
eqns (1) and (2) respectively. Consumer i will prefer buying to pay-per-use only if UiS(pS) >
UiO(pO). Therefore, consumers will buy only if their usage frequency is higher than a certain critical
frequency denoted by θc =
pS
(pO+T )D
. Consumers with θi < θc either choose pay-per-use or abstain
from the market. The market shares of the mechanisms are described in Figure 2.
In the corresponding Nash equilibrium, the payment-per-use is pO =
T (φH−T )
φH+T
, and the selling
price satisfies the implicit equation: θHφH − 2pSφH(pO+T )D +
2pS
D
log[ pS
(pO+T )θHD
] + pS
D
= 0 (Proofs are
in Electronic Appendix 5). Our findings are summarized in Propositions 3 and 4 (Proofs are in
Electronic Appendices 6 and 7).
Proposition 3: The equilibrium payment per-use and the selling price in the duopoly are lower
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Figure 2 Market shares for pay-per-use pricing and selling in duopoly
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than the corresponding optimal payment-per-use and selling price when a monopolist uses the mech-
anisms independently. However, the equilibrium payment-per-use of the pay-per-use provider in the
duopoly first increases, and then decreases with transaction cost (T).
Figure 3 Selling price and payment-per-use in base case and duopoly
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Proposition 3 captures the price suppressing effect of competition. However, in addition, there
are some subtle and interesting forces at work here (see Figures 3, 4 and 5 for a comparison of
prices, profits, and market shares across the base case and the duopoly (plotted for θH = φH = 1,
D = 5). In the duopoly, one would expect that payment-per-use and profits of the pay-per-use
provider are high when the associated transaction cost (T ) is low. However, when T is very low,
both the payment-per-use and the profits of pay-per-use provider are low. Both initially increase as
T increases, leading to the increasing part of the inverted U-shaped profit function. The intuition
is that, when T is very low, the seller has to sharply lower prices to attract consumers – this
enhances competition and lowers profits across the board. As T increases, the competitive pressure
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decreases and the profits of both firms increase. However, as T increases even further, the profits
of the pay-per-use provider begin to decrease because that mechanism is ultimately less attractive
from the consumer’s viewpoint.
Figure 4 Profits from selling and pay-per-use pricing in base case and duopoly
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Proposition 4: In a duopoly, the profits of the seller are always higher than those of the firm
that offers pay-per-use pricing.
Proposition 4 is interesting in several respects. Recall that when T is low, a monopolist will prefer
pay-per-use pricing over selling. However, in a duopoly, the seller’s profits are higher even when T
is low. The intuition is as follows. When the pay-per-use provider increases its payment-per-use,
it loses substantial revenues because all consumers with a utility per-use that is lower than that
payment drop out, taking the entire temporal stream of revenue associated with them. In contrast,
under selling, the usage frequency contributes to the total projected utility of the consumer and
ties the consumer to the selling mechanism. Further, selling captures the “best” consumers – those
with high utility-per-use and high usage frequency in a duopoly – leaving the less attractive fraction
of the market to the pay-per-use mechanism (see Figure 2). The ability of pay-per-use to allow
consumers to flexibly tailor payments to usage is a strength in the monopoly context. The reverse
side of the coin, though, is the inability of pay-per-use pricing to lock in consumers at an early
stage. This inability has no adverse consequences in a monopoly, but hurts the mechanism in a
duopoly.
Propositions 1 and 4 jointly offer some interesting insights on the choice of both mechanisms.
When T is low, a firm will adopt pay-per-use if it does not expect competition. However, if it expects
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competition, it will sell the good instead. That is, the firm will adopt a “defensive positioning”
strategy, where it accepts lower profits which are more robust in the face of competition, rather
than higher profits that are susceptible to significant erosion on competitive entry.
The consumer surplus and social welfare generated by the selling and the pay-per-use mechanisms
are derived in Electronic Appendix 8 and plotted in Figure 13 in the Electronic Appendix. When T
is low, the consumer surplus and social welfare generated by the pay-per-use mechanism is higher
because the firm is forced to offer a low payment-per-use. When T is high, the consumer surplus
and social welfare generated by selling are higher.
Figure 5 Selling and pay-per-use market shares in base case and duopoly
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3.4. Selling and pay-per-use pricing with upgrades
In this section, we consider the impact of a future upgrade to the information good in a monopoly
(where the monopolist can choose either selling or pay-per-use pricing) and in a duopoly (where
one firm chooses selling and the other chooses pay-per-use pricing), where the upgrade is a part of
the sequential product introduction strategy of the firm (Padmanabhan et al. 1997). We assume
that consumers are myopic, myopic consumers have no foresight regarding the introduction of the
upgrade. Therefore, the upgrade will introduce no competitive effect because these consumers will
initially choose between selling and pay-per-use pricing solely based on the base information good.
Later on, these consumers will simply decide whether or not to purchase the upgrade.
Let the upgrade be introduced in period k, where k <N . The consumer obtains a higher per-use
utility of aφ (a > 1) from the upgrade. Therefore, post-upgrade, the per-use utility is uniformly
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distributed between 0 and aφH . Let Dk−1 denote the NPV factor over k−1 periods (Dk−1 = 1−δk−11−δ ),
and D denote the NPV factor over N periods (as before).
3.4.1. Upgrades in a monopoly First, consider a monopolist who adopts pay-per-use pricing
in a market where consumers are myopic. The profits from the base good and the upgrade are
denoted by, respectively:
ΠO1(pO1) =
φH−(pO1+T )
φH
θH
2
pO1Dk−1 ; ΠO2(pO2) =
aφH−(pO2+T )
aφH
θH
2
pO2(D−Dk−1) (5.1)
The total profits are ΠO = ΠO1 + ΠO2 (from eqn 5.1). Because the upgrade delivers a higher
utility, the firm charges a higher per-use payment after the upgrade has been introduced (the
optimal per-period payments are derived in the Electronic Appendix 9).
Second, consider the case where the monopolist employs selling in a market where consumers
are myopic. Here, the base good will be priced exactly as in the monopoly without upgrades and
profits are identical to that case as well (see eqn. (4) for the profit expression). Consumers only
pay for the additional utility derived from the upgrade. If the upgrade is introduced in period k,
this additional surplus is: (a− 1)φθ(D−Dk−1)− δk−1pU . This additional surplus is set to zero to
find the fraction of consumers who will buy the upgrade. This condition is structurally identical
to that which applies when consumers decide whether or not to buy the base good. Therefore, all
consumers who purchase the base good will also choose to upgrade. The profits from the upgrade
alone (ΠS2) are denoted by:
ΠS2(pU) = δ
k−1pUMSS2 =
δk−1pU
φHθH
[θHφH− δ
k−1pU
(a−1)(D−Dk−1) +
δk−1pU
(a−1)(D−Dk−1) log(
δk−1pU
(a−1)θHφH (D−Dk−1))](5.2)
When consumers are myopic, the monopolist first solves for the optimal price of the base good.
Given the optimal price pS1 for the base good, the firm then solves for the optimal upgrade price
that maximizes the profits denoted in eqn. (5.2) above. In doing so, the monopolist must ensure
that MSS2 ≤MSS1,so that only a subset of consumers who purchased the base good will purchase
the upgrade. This condition is satisfied because all consumers who purchased the base good will also
buy the upgrade. With this setting, the key finding here is summarized as follows (See Electronic
Appendix 9 for proof):
Proposition 5: If a monopolist offers the information good with a future upgrade, then the
cut-off transaction cost below which pay-per-use pricing yields higher profits than selling is higher
compared to the case where the firm only offers the basic information good. Therefore, the presence
of the future upgrade increases the relative attractiveness of pay-per-use pricing compared to selling.
In a monopoly, the cut-off transaction cost below which pay-per-use pricing is superior to selling
is TC = 0.0976φH (see Proposition 1). According to the result, the cut-off transaction cost is higher
16
than 0.0976φH if the monopolist offers a future upgrade. The intuition is as follows. Under pay-
per-use, the payment-per-use can easily be shifted upward to recapture a substantial fraction of the
surplus generated by the increase in utility-per-use delivered by the upgrade. In contrast, the selling
mechanism cannot separately deal with this increase in utility-per-use because here consumers
consider the total utility derived from a combination of usage utility and usage frequency. Therefore,
selling is less efficient at recapturing the surplus generated by the upgrade.
3.4.2. Upgrades in a duopoly Myopic consumers do not expect the upgrade – therefore,
competition in the context of the base good is identical to competition in the case without the
upgrade. However, once the consumers are locked into either mechanism for the base good, the
competitors simply price the upgrade when it is introduced as if they were monopolists with captive
customers. The following proposition describes how the upgrade affects the attractiveness of the
two pricing mechanisms (See Electronic Appendix 10 for proof):
Proposition 6: Consider a duopoly where one firm sells the information good and the other
adopts pay-per-use pricing. If the competitors offer a future upgrade, the profits of firm that sells the
good increases to a greater extent than those of the firm that adopts pay-per-use pricing. Therefore,
the presence of the future upgrade increases the relative attractiveness of selling compared to pay-
per-use pricing in a duopoly.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is as follows. In a duopoly, if the firm that offers pay-per-
use pricing increases its per-use payment for the base information good and the upgrade, it loses
substantial revenues. This is because all consumers with a utility-per-use that is lower than the
revised per-use payment drop out, taking the entire temporal stream of revenue associated with
them. In contrast, under selling, the frequency of usage contributes to the total projected utility of
the consumer and performs the role of tying the consumer more tightly to the selling mechanism.
Therefore, even with the upgrade, selling can address the market more efficiently in a competitive
setting by jointly leveraging the utility-per-use and the usage frequency dimensions.
From Proposition 3, we know that in a competitive environment, the firm that adopts the selling
mechanism has higher profits from the base information good than the firm that adopts the pay-
per-use mechanism. When the two firms introduce the upgrade, they no longer compete with
each other for the upgrade because consumers have chosen either the pay-per-use mechanism or
the selling mechanism for the base good (under certain conditions that prevent consumers from
switching to the other mechanism, which can be seen to be easily satisfied for the upgrade to yield
positive utility to either set of consumers). Because the market share of the selling mechanism for
the base information good is higher under competition, and because selling has already captured
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the customers whose utility-per-use and usage frequency are jointly high, the firm that sells can
price the upgrade to extract a higher profit than the firm that adopts pay-per-use. Therefore, the
presence of the upgrade benefits the seller to a greater extent in a duopoly.
4. Duopoly with vertical differentiation
We now consider the case where duopolists who offer vertically differentiated information goods
can each either or both pricing mechanisms (Soberman 2005). We assume that usage frequency
(θi) and base utility-per-use (φH) are both distributed U[0,1] – however, firm 1’s (superior) good
yields a utility-per-use of φ (as before), whereas firm 2’s good yields a utility-per-use of λφ (λ< 1).
Here, λ is the differentiation factor. Accordingly, consumer i derives the following net utilities from
each firm-mechanism combination:
Firm 1: Pay-per-use: UO1(pO1) = θi(φi−T − pO1)D; Buy: US1(pS1) = φiθiD− pS1
Firm 2: Pay-per-use: UO2(pO2) = θi(λφ−T − pO2)D; Buy: US2(pS2) = λθiφiD− pS2
We analyze two cases, corresponding to (a) low levels of transaction cost T ; and (b) very high
levels of T.
Low T : Each firm adopts both pricing mechanisms when T < 0.11. When T is low (0<T < 0.11),
the division of market shares is described in Figure 6.
Figure 6 Market share division for low transaction costs
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As seen in Figure 6, consumers with a usage frequency lower than a certain critical frequency
will prefer pay-per-use pricing. The critical frequency varies with the region that adjoins the pay-
per-use market share on its right hand side in Figure 6. For example, the pay-per-use market share
of firm 2 always is always adjoined to the right by the selling market share of firm 2. Therefore, the
critical frequency for the pay-per-use market share of firm 2 is always pS2
(pO2+T )D
− this is captured
by the vertical boundary, which represents a fixed usage frequency. Likewise, for low T (Figure 6),
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the pay-per-use market share of firm 1 is adjoined to the right by the selling market share of firm
1 for high levels of usage utility φ− here again, the critical frequency is pS1
(pO1+T )D
, which is again
represented by a vertical boundary. However, for lower values of φ in Figure 6, the pay-per-use
market share of firm 1 is adjoined by the selling market share of firm 2. To find the critical frequency
in these regions, we set UO1(pO1) = US2(pS2). The critical frequency here is θi =
pS2
[pO1+T−(1−λ)φi]D .
Intuitively, this frequency is now additionally a function of λ and utility-per-use (φ) because the
competing goods yield different levels of utility.
Analytical expressions for the market shares and profits are derived in Electronic Appendix 11.
We numerically characterize the Nash equilibria. The equilibrium profits are plotted for different
values of T (0< T < 0.11, representing low transaction costs) in Figure 7 and for different values
of the differentiation factor λ in Figure 8.
Figure 7 Variation of selling, pay-per-use and total profits with T
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The analysis yields some interesting insights. First, the profits in Figure 7 correspond to the
case where the market is competitive (λ= 0.9) and T is low – the configuration of market shares
corresponds to Figure 6. Here, each firm uses both pricing mechanisms, but the profits from selling
to each firm are much higher than those from pay-per-use. This effect is more pronounced as T
increases because the profits from pay-per-use decrease in T . In particular, the profits from the
pay-per-use mechanism for firm 2, that offers lower quality, are marginal. Therefore, as T increases,
we can expect the firms, and firm 2 in particular, to discard the pay-per-use mechanism.
Moving to Figure 8, we observe that firm 1’s profits from both selling and pay-per-use are
uniformly decreasing in λ. When λ is low, the firms are sufficiently differentiated. Therefore, firm
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Figure 8 Variation of selling, pay-per-use and total profits with λ
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1 adopts both pricing mechanisms and prices its (superior quality) good akin to a monopolist.
As λ increases, the market becomes more competitive. Here, firm 1 prefers to use the selling
mechanism to a greater degree to generate profits because, as discussed earlier in this paper,
that mechanism performs better than pay-per-use in a competitive setting. When λ is low, firm
2 also uses a combination of the two mechanisms – however, given that its information good
is of much lower quality, its profits are substantially lower than those of firm 1 (comparing the
profits in Figure 8). As λ increases from 0.2 to 0.5, the profits of firm 2 increase. Intuitively, even
though the market becomes more competitive, firm 2 benefits from the increase in the quality of
its information good. However, as λ increases yet further (λ≥ 0.6), the profits of firm 2 decrease
because the negative implications of increased competition overshadow the positive implications of
better quality. Finally, as the market becomes extremely competitive, we see that firm 2 discards
the pay-per-use mechanism, and relies on purely selling the information good. As discussed earlier,
there is no equilibrium with non-zero profits in an undifferentiated setting (λ = 1) that involves
any firm offering both mechanisms, or both firm offering the same mechanism.
High T : When T > 0.5, both firms drop the pay-per-use mechanism and adopt only selling.
The profits of the two firms are plotted with respect to the differentiation factor λ in Figure 9
(see Electronic Appendix 11 for derivations of equilibrium outcomes and Figure 14 in Electronic
Appendix 11 for market shares). We see that firm 1’s profits are decreasing throughout in λ.
In contrast, firm 2’s profits increase with λ when λ is low. However, for λ > 0.6, the negative
implications of increased competition are stronger than the positive implications of higher quality,
and firm 2’s profits decrease with λ.
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Figure 9 Variation of selling, pay-per-use and total profits with λ for very high T
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Overall, our findings in this section highlight the importance of thinking about how the pay-
per-use and selling mechanisms can work in cooperation with each other to enhance profits, and
competitively against each other to reduce profits. The optimal go-to-market strategy should bal-
ance these forces with the objective of maximizing firm-level profits.
5. Model extensions and tests for robustness
We extended the model in multiple directions and also tested our findings for robustness:
Variability in usage frequency and utility-per-use: We find that variability in usage fre-
quency does not affect the relative performance of the two mechanisms (Electronic Appendix 12).
If the utility-per-use is higher later in the horizon, the profits under pay-per-use rise more sharply
as the pay-per-use mechanism differentiates perfectly between consumers on the utility-per-use
dimension. Therefore, such an increase in the utility-per-use increases the attractiveness of the
pay-per-use mechanism. However, when the utility-per-use decreases later in the horizon, the mar-
ket share under pay-per-use decreases sharply because the firm is forced to choose a substantially
lower payment-per-use later in the horizon.
Inclusion of implementation and service costs: In an enterprise software context, we
assume that when a software application is purchased outright, an enterprise client incurs a one-
time implementation cost (C) and a service (or maintenance) cost each time the application is
used (cs) (Electronic Appendix 13). Under pay-per-use, the service provider incurs a one-time
implementation cost (S) to move the enterprise client’s database to the service provider’s server,
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and a service cost (co) each time the client uses the application. As might be expected, an increase
in C and cs favors pay-per-use whereas an increase in S and co favors selling, which is similar to
Ma and Seidmann (2007). Effectively, implementation and service costs shift the boundary that
demarcates the parametric regions where one pricing mechanism yields higher profits than the
other.
Correlated utility dimensions: Modifying the assumption that utility-per-use and usage
frequency are independently distributed, we analyzed the case where these dimensions are perfectly
correlated, so that consumers with high utility-per-use also have a high usage frequency (Electronic
Appendix 14). We find that such correlation further enhances the relative advantage of the pay-
per-use mechanism in a monopoly context. This is because the market share of the pay-per-use
mechanism generally consists of consumers with a high utility-per-use. If these consumers also have
a high usage frequency, the revenue streams that accrue to this mechanism are of even greater
magnitude. The reverse is true in a duopoly with undifferentiated information goods. Intuitively,
under competition, the market share carved out by the selling mechanism consists of consumers
whose utility-per-use and usage utility are both relatively high even when these utility dimensions
are independently distributed. However, when these dimensions are perfectly correlated, selling
efficiently captures the most valuable part of the market. Therefore, such correlation enhances the
relative advantage of selling over pay-per-use in the competitive context.
Non-uniform distributions of utility-per-use and usage frequency: We modified the
assumption that utility-per-use and usage frequency were uniformly distributed (Electronic
Appendix 15). Consider the case where each pricing mechanism is independently used by the
monopolist. First, if utility-per-use has an upper triangular distribution (skewed to the right), we
find that the pay-per-use mechanism does better than in the uniform distribution case. Intuitively,
the market share of the pay-per-use mechanism is graduated solely on the utility-per-use dimension
– therefore, this mechanism can efficiently capture consumers with a high utility-per-use. Selling,
on the other hand, does not benefit as strongly under this distribution because it does not serve
consumers with a low usage frequency, even if their utility-per-use is high. Conversely, if utility-
per-use has a lower triangular distribution (skewed to the left), then the selling mechanism does
better than in the uniform distribution case. This is because the scarcity of consumers with high
utility-per-use hurts the pay-per-use mechanism.
Next, consider the case where usage frequency has an upper triangular distribution (skewed to
the right). Here, we find that, while both mechanisms yield a higher profit than in the uniform dis-
tribution case, selling benefits to a greater extent. This is because selling captures more consumers
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with both a higher utility-per-use and a higher usage frequency. In contrast, some consumers with a
high utility-per-use who are captured by pay-per-use now use the information good less frequently.
Finally, consider the case where usage frequency has a lower triangular distribution (skewed to the
left). Here, the profits from both mechanisms decrease compared to the uniform distribution case,
but the profits from selling decrease more sharply. This is because selling would ideally capture
customers with both a high utility-per-use and a high frequency, but fewer customers now exhibit
both these characteristics.
Endogenous usage frequency: Finally, we analyzed the case where consumers (endogenously)
reduced their usage frequency if the payment-per-use was high in a setting where a monopolist
chose one of the two mechanisms (Electronic Appendix 16). Here, we find that the monopolist
who adopts pay-per-use lowers the payment-per-period to accommodate this externality. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, selling becomes more attractive in the presence of such endogeneity.
6. Conclusion
We analyzed two pricing mechanisms for information goods – selling, where an up-front payment
bestows unrestricted usage rights, and pay-per-use, where payments are closely tailored to the
consumer’s usage patterns. Consumer utility was modeled as a function of the usage frequency and
the utility-per-use of the good.
We first considered a monopolist who could employ either mechanism. Here, we first showed that
as long as the transaction cost associated with pay-per-use is low, profits from that mechanism
are higher than those from selling. Intuitively, pay-per-use pricing achieves perfect discrimination
along the usage frequency dimension by allowing consumers to pay for the good only when it was
used. In contrast, selling is attractive to consumers who have both a relatively high utility-per-use
and a high usage frequency. We then showed that the presence of a positive unit marginal cost
lowers profits from both mechanisms but hurts selling more than pay-per-use. This is because,
under pay-per-use, there is superior resource pooling and a smaller quantity of goods, representing
a lower total marginal cost, can be more intensively used by multiple customers across time to
satisfy market demand.
Next, we considered the impact of uncertainty in consumer utility-per-use and usage frequency.
We demonstrate that pay-per-use performs relatively well when usage frequency is uncertain. Going
further, we demonstrate that uncertainty in utility-per-use lowers profits from both mechanisms,
but lowers profits from pay-per-use to a greater. This is because the market share of the pay-
per-use mechanism is determined solely based on the distribution of utility-per-use, whereas the
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reduction in the profits from selling is tempered by the fact that the distribution of usage frequency
is known with certainty. If both the usage frequency and the utility-per-use are uncertain, then
profits under pay-per-use reduce to a lower extent than under selling compared to the case where
both are known with certainty because pay-per-use is not affected by uncertainty along the usage
frequency dimension.
Moving to the competitive context, we analyzed a duopoly where firms offering identical infor-
mation goods could employ either or both pricing mechanisms. We find that, in equilibrium, one
firm adopts selling and the competitor adopts pay-per-use. Here, in contrast to the monopoly, the
seller’s profits generally dominate the pay-per-use provider’s profits. The key implication is that
a monopolist who employs one pricing mechanism is better off with pay-per-use pricing provided
the associated transaction costs are not too high. In contrast, a monopolist who expects future
competition should pursue a “defensive” positioning strategy and choose to sell the good instead.
We also find that the profits of the pay-per-use provider were inverted U-shaped with respect to
the transaction cost associated with that mechanism. The intuition was traced back to the role of
the transaction cost in moderating the level of competition in the market.
We then analyzed a duopoly where firms offering vertically differentiated information goods could
employ either or both pricing mechanisms. When the transaction costs associated with pay-per-use
are low, we find that each firm adopts both mechanisms, but the major share of the profits for each
firm accrues from selling. Whereas the pay-per-use mechanisms contributes only weakly to profits,
the high payments-per-use play a role in propping up the selling prices and increasing profits from
selling. The profits of the firm offering the superior information good are strictly decreasing in the
quality of the competitor. In contrast, the profits of the firm offering the inferior information good
are inverted U-shaped in the quality of the good – the initial improvement in quality increases
profits, but as the separation between the two competing goods decreases, further improvement
in quality depresses profits on account of more intense competition. When the transaction cost
associated with pay-per-use is high, the firm offering the inferior good dispenses with pay-per-use
pricing and adopts only selling, whereas the competitor adopts both mechanisms. This reduces the
intensity of competition and increases the profits of both firms. Finally, when the transaction cost
is very high, both firms adopt only selling. Overall, our findings provide a range of insights into
how pricing strategies for information goods must be designed in various market environments.
Our analysis has the following limitations that can be addressed by future research. First, the
role of usage frequency-based discounts and other price discrimination mechanisms can be analyzed
in both the monopoly and competitive contexts. Second, we have primarily focused on the case
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where consumers are differentiated in terms of utility-per-use and usage frequency. Future work
could incorporate the notion of horizontal differentiation where consumers have varying preferences
for the offerings. This is an emerging research domain and much remains to be done. We hope our
analysis and findings catalyze further inquiry in the area.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX A1: Proof of Proposition 1:
If the firm charges a payment-per-use of pO, all consumers with φi ≥ pO +T use the information
good. The market fraction using the good is, therefore: φH−(pO+T )
φH
. The average frequency of use
for consumers in this fraction in any given period is θH
2
. The expected profits for the firm are:
ΠO =
φH−(pO+T )
φH
θH
2
pOD
The first order condition (FOC, henceforth) with respect to pO yields pO =
φH−T
2
. The second
order condition (SOC, henceforth) for ΠO to be concave can easily be seen to be satisfied because
ΠO is quadratic in pO with a negative sign on the square term (the second derivative of ΠO with
respect to pO is −1). Substituting the optimal value for pO in the expression for the market fraction
and profits yields the optimal outcomes.
Under selling, if the firm sets a selling price of pS, then in Figure 2, at any given usage utility
φ,consumers with usage frequencies in the range θ ∈ [ pS
φD
, θH ] derive (weakly) positive utility from
the purchase. From Figure 1, the market fraction thay buys the good and the profits, respectively,
are denoted by:
MSS =
1
φHθH
∫ θH
pS
φHD
[φH − pSθD ]dθ= 1φHθH [θHφH −
pS
D
+ pS
D
log{ pS
θHφHD
}]
ΠS =
pS
φHθH
[θHφH − pSD + pSD log{ pSθHφHD}]
The FOC with respect to pS yields
2pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
} − pS
θHφHD
+ 1 = 0. If pS
θHφHD
= d, then
d= 0.285, and therefore pS = 0.285θHφHD. The SOC evaluated at pS = 0.285θHφHD reveals that
the second derivative with respect to pS is negative. For all conditions of pO and pS in all the
sections in this paper, the FOCs are sufficient because the optimal solutions have to be interior
point solutions (except for the monopoly case, where the firm may prefer one mechanism to the
other). This is because the profits go to zero if pO and pS are priced at the extremities (if either pO
or pS is zero, then the margins are zero, and if they are equal to the upper bounds, then the market
shares are zero). Substituting the optimal value for pS in the expression for the market fraction
and profits yields the optimal outcomes. Equating the profits from pay-per-use pricing and selling
yields the cut-off transaction cost.
Social Welfare: We first integrate the cumulative surplus of all consumers who use the infor-
mation good by pay-per-use (consumers with φi > p
∗
O +T ).
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Pay-per-use: CS(p∗O) =
1
θHφH
∫ φH
p∗
O
+T
(φ−T − p∗O)dφ
∫ θH
0
θdθD
= 1
φH
(φH−T )2
16
θHD since p
∗
O =
φH−T
2
.
From Equation (2), if the monopolost uses the selling mechanism, consumer i’s cumulative surplus
is given by:
Selling: UiS(pS) = θiφiD− pS
We next integrate the cumulative surplus of all consumers who buy the information good (con-
sumers with θiφiD > p
∗
S = 0.285θHφH). For consumers with a given θ, the surplus is given by∫ φH
0.285θHφH
θ
(θφ − θHφH)Ddφ. The frequency of usage varies from 0.285θH (when φ = φH) to θH .
Hence,
CS(p∗S) =
1
θHφH
[
∫ θH
0.285θH
{∫ φH0.285θHφH
θ
(θφD− p∗S)dφ}dθ]
= 0.0769θHφHD.
The social welfare is given by the sum of the profits and net consumer surplus from that mech-
anism. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX FOR
Pricing Information Goods: A Strategic Analysis of the Selling and Pay-per-use
Mechanisms
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 1: Joint use of pay-per-use and selling mechanisms in
a monopoly:
Recall that the utilities related to pay-per-use pricing and buying are UiO(pO) = θi(φi−T −pO)D
and UiS(pS) = θiφiD− pS respectively. Consumer i uses pay-per-use only if UiO(pO)> UiS(pS), if
their usage frequency is higher than a critical frequency θc =
pS
(pO+T )D
. Others will prefer pay-per-
use, or not participate in the market. From Figure 2, the analytical expressions for the market
shares of the selling and pay-per-use mechanisms are the same as in the duopoly, given by:
MSS(pS, pO) =
1
φHθH
[
∫ θH
pS
φHD
[φH − pSθD ]dθ−
∫ pS
(pO+T )D
pS
φHD
[φH − pSθD ]dθ]
= 1
φHθH
[θHφH − pSφH(pO+T )D +
pS
D
log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}]
MSO(pS, pO) =
1
φHθH
[φH − (pO +T )] pS(pO+T )D
In calculating MSS(pS, pO) above, we subtract out those consumers with a usage frequency lower
than θc from the market share of selling in the monopoly case. The profits from the selling and
pay-per-use mechanisms, and total profits are, respectively:
ΠS(pS, pO) =
1
φHθH
[θHφH − pSφH(pO+T )D +
pS
D
log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}]pS
ΠO(pS, pO) =
1
2φHθH
[φH − (pO +T )][ pS(pO+T )D ]2pOD
Π(pS, pO) =
1
φHθH
[θHφH − pSφH(pO+T )D +
pS
D
log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}]pS + 12φHθH [φH − (pO +T )][
pS
(pO+T )D
]2pOD
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Here, the profits corresponding to pay-per-use are computed by multiplying the market share
for pay-per-use pricing and the total payments discounted over time with the average frequency of
usage, given by pS
2(pO+T )D
. The analytical expressions for the optimal selling price and the payment-
per-use are derived from the FOCs of Π(pS, pO) with respect to pS and pO. The optimal payment-
per-period derived from the FOCs is: pO =
1
4
[φH − T +
√
(φH −T )2 + 16φHT ]− T. Further, from
the FOCs, the optimal selling price satisfies the following implicit equation: θHφH − pS(φH−T )(pO+T )D +
2pS
D
log[ pS
(pO+T )θHD
]− pSφHT
(pO+T )
2D
= 0. After substituting the closed form expression for pO, this implicit
equation can be solved to yield the optimal price for any given set of parameters θH and φH .
Figure 10 Profits from joint use of sellng and pay-per-use in a monopoly
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θH0
Pay-per-use
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pO+T
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θc=pS/(pO+T)D
Figure 10 describes the monopolist’s profits from using both mechanisms jointly (assuming θH =
φH = 1, D= 5). The optimal payment-per-period and the optimal price increase from the base case
where the monopolist uses each mechanism alone. It can be verified that the monopolist obtains a
lower market share from each mechanism compared to when each is used independently. However,
the total market share is higher when the mechanisms are used jointly than when each is used
independently. Further, even when both mechanisms are available, the monopolist uses pay-per-
use pricing alone when transaction cost T=0, both mechanisms when T is at a moderate level
(with a substantial fraction of the total profit accruing from pay-per-use pricing), and the selling
mechanism alone when T is high. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 2: Analysis with positive unit variable cost:
As before, the market fraction that participates under pay-per-use pricing is φH−(pO+T )
φH
. The
average frequency with which consumers use pay-per-use pricing in any given period is θH
2
. The
expected profits for the firm are ΠO =
φH−(pO+T )
φH
θH
2
(pOD− c). To explain this profit function, note
that the market share is multiplied by the average frequency of usage of θH
2
to yield the total
number of times the good is used in any given period. The resulting quantity is then multiplied
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by pO to yield the total revenue per period. Finally, multiplying the revenue by the NPV discount
factor D yields the discounted value of total revenues. On the cost side, the firm needs to produce
at the outset the quantity of goods that will be used during each period – this is denoted by
φH−(pO+T )
φH
θH
2
– at the cost of c per unit. For example, at a video store, a fixed number of DVDs
are procured, which can be used over multiple months. This cost is subtracted from the revenues
to yield the net profits in the expression above. Alternatively, if the firm sells the good outright,
then from eqn (4), the profits are:
ΠS =
(pS−c)
φHθH
[θHφH − pSD + pSD log( pSθHφHD )]
The optimal payments per period and the optimal selling price are derived from the correspond-
ing FOCs. The optimal per-period payment is pO =
(φH−T )D+c
2
and the corresponding profits are
ΠO =
[(φH−T )D−c]2θH
8φHD
. The optimal price is characterized by the implicit equation θHφH − pSD +
2pS
D
log( pS
θHφHD
)− c
D
log( pS
θHφHD
) = 0.
Both the optimal per-period payment and the optimal price increase if there is a positive unit
variable cost. This is intuitive. The cut-off transaction cost below which pay-per-use pricing yields
higher profits than selling is described in the figure in Figure 11 (for D= 5).
Figure 11 Cut-off transaction cost ratio TC
φH
with unit variable cost c (D= 5)
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As observed in Figure 11, the cut-off transaction cost (TC) increases in the unit variable cost.
That is, the presence of a positive unit variable cost increases the relative attractiveness of pay-
per-use compared to selling. 
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ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 3A
Proof of Proposition 2a:
If the firm adopts the selling mechanism and sets a selling price of pS, the market share of the
firm is:
MS+(pS) =
1
φH (θH+v)
[(θH + v)φH − pSD + pSD log( pS(θH+v)φHD )] if the actual frequency of usage
θ˜U(0, θH + v).
MS−(pS) = 1φH (θH−v) [(θH − v)φH −
pS
D
+ pS
D
log( pS
(θH−v)φHD )] if the actual frequency of usage
θ˜U(0, θH − v).
The expected profits of the firm are:
E[ΠS(pS)] = pS
MS+(pS)+MS−(pS)
2
If the firm adopts pay-per-use and sets a payment-per-use of pO, its profits are:
ΠO+(pO) =
φH−(pO+T )
φH
(θH+v)
2
pOD if the actual frequency of usage θ˜U(0, θH + v).
ΠO−(pO) =
φH−(pO+T )
φH
(θH−v)
2
pOD if the actual frequency of usage θ˜U(0, θH − v).
The expected profits of the firm are E[ΠO(pO)] =
ΠO+(pO)+ΠO−(pO)
2
.
If the firm uses pay-per-use in the presence of uncertainty in usage frequency, its expected profits
are:
E[ΠO(pO)] =
ΠO+(pO)+ΠO−(pO)
2
=⇒E[ΠO+(pO)] = φH−(pO+T )φH
(θH+v)
2
pOD, which is the same as the
case where the distribution of the frequency of usage is known with certainty. Therefore, the firm
sets the payment-per-use pO =
φH−T
2
and optimal profits are E[ΠO(pO)] =
1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
D.
If the firm adopts selling, its expected profits are:
E[ΠS(pS)] = pS
MS+(pS)+MS−(pS)
2
where
MS+(pS) =
1
φH (θH+v)
[(θH + v)φH − pSD + pSD log( pS(θH+v)φHD )] and
MS−(pS) = 1φH (θH−v) [(θH − v)φH −
pS
D
+ pS
D
log( pS
(θH−v)φHD )].
The expected profits under selling are:
E[ΠS(pS)] =
pS
2
[{1− pS
φH (θH+v)D
+ pS
φH (θH+v)D
log( pS
(θH+v)φHD
)}
+{1− pS
φH (θH−v)D +
pS
φH (θH−v)D log(
pS
(θH−v)φHD )}]
In the case without uncertainty, the profits of the firm under selling mechanism are:
ΠS = pS[1− pSθHφHD +
pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
}]
We need to show that, when the firm adopts selling, expected profits under uncertainty are lower
than those under no uncertainty. That is, we need to show that:
pS
2
[{1− pS
φH (θH+v)D
+ pS
φH (θH+v)D
log( pS
(θH+v)φHD
)}+ {1− pS
φH (θH−v)D +
pS
φH (θH−v)D log(
pS
(θH−v)φHD )}]
< pS[1− pSθHφHD +
pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
}]
This is true by Jensen’s inequality because for a concave function f , f(x+v)+f(x−v)< 2f(x).
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Now, to show that f(θH) = pS[1− pSθHφHD +
pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
}] is concave in θH ,we note that
∂2f(θH )
∂2θH
= pS[−1 + 2 log{ pSθHφHD}]< 0. This is because pS < θHφHD for selling to be feasible.
Therefore, profits under selling when there is uncertainty in the distribution of usage frequency
are lower than in the absence of uncertainty. Because the profits of the firm under pay-per-use are
identical across the cases with and without uncertainty in usage frequency, the cut-off transaction
cost below which pay-use-use yields higher profits than selling is higher in the presence of such
uncertainty. Stated differently, such uncertainty makes pay-per-use more attractive from the firm’s
perspective. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 3B
Proof of Proposition 2b:
If the firm adopts selling and sets a selling price of pS, its market share is:
MS+(pS) =
1
θH (φH+v)
[(φH + v)θH − pSD + pSD log( pS(φH+v)θHD )] if the utility-per-use φ˜U(0, φH + v)
MS−(pS) = 1θH (φH−v) [(φH − v)θH −
pS
D
+ pS
D
log( pS
(φH−v)θHD )] if the utility-per-use φ˜U(0, φH − v).
The expected profits are:
E[ΠS(pS)] = pS
MS+(pS)+MS−(pS)
2
If the firm adopts pay-per-use and sets a payment-per-use of pO, its profits are
ΠO+(pO) =
φH+v−(pO+T )
φH+v
θH
2
pOD if the actual frequency of usage φ˜U(0, φH + v).
ΠO−(pO) =
φH−v−(pO+T )
φH−v
θH
2
pOD if the actual frequency of usage φ˜U(0, φH − v).
The expected profits of the firm are E[ΠO(pO)] =
ΠO+(pO)+ΠO−(pO)
2
= [1− pO+T
φH− v
2
φH
] θH
2
pOD. Denote φH − v2φH by φH . Then E[ΠO(pO)] = [1−
pO+T
φH
] θH
2
pOD. The FOC
with respect to pO yields pO =
φH−T
2
and the expected profits under pay-per-use are E[ΠO(pO)] =
1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
D.
Under selling, the expected profits are:
E[ΠS(pS)] =
pS
2
[{1− pS
(φH+v)θHD
+ pS
(φH+v)θHD
log( pS
(φH+v)θHD
)}+ {1− pS
(φH−v)θHD +
pS
(φH−v)θHD log(
pS
(φH−v)θHD )}]
E[ΠS(pS)] = pS[1− pSθHφHD +
pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
}+K] (E2a.1)
where φH = φH − v
2
φH
and
K = 1
2
[ pS
(φH+v)θHD
log( pS
(φH+v)θHD
) + pS
(φH−v)θHD log(
pS
(φH−v)θHD )]−
pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
}
Condition A1: We show that K > 0 because
pS
(φH+v)θHD
log( pS
(φH+v)θHD
) + pS
(φH−v)θHD log(
pS
(φH−v)θHD )>
2pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
}
That is, we prove that
pS
(φH+v)θHD
log( pS
θHD
) + pS
(φH+v)θHD
log 1
φH+v
+ pS
(φH−v)θHD log(
pS
θHD
) + pS
(φH−v)θHD log
1
φH−v >
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2pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
}
=⇒To prove that
1
φH+v
log( pS
θHD
) + 1
φH+v
log 1
φH+v
+ 1
φH−v log(
pS
θHD
) + 1
φH−v log
1
φH−v >
2
φH
log{ pS
θHD
}+ 2
φH
log{ 1
φH
}
The terms corresponding to log( pS
θHD
) cancel out. Therefore, we need to prove that:
1
φH+v
log 1
φH+v
+ 1
φH−v log
1
φH−v >
2
φH
log{ 1
φH
}
On simplifying, this reduces to proving that
(φH + v) log(φH + v) + (φH − v) log(φH − v)> 2φH logφH
which is true by Jensen’s inequality, because if f is a convex function of x, f(x+v) +f(x−v)>
2f(x). f(φH) = φH logφH is a convex function of φH as
∂2
∂2φH
(φH logφH) =
1
φH
> 0. Therefore,
Condition A1 is true.
From Equation (E2a.1),
E[ΠS(pS)] = pS[1− pSθHφHD +
pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
}+K]
> pS[1− pSθHφHD +
pS
θHφHD
log{ pS
θHφHD
}] (E2a.2)
Let pS be the price that maximized the RHS in equation (E2a.2). pS = 0.285θHφHD. Substituting
this back in (E2a.2) gives
E[ΠS(pS)]> 0.1018θHφHD
We have already proved that E[ΠO(pO)] =
1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
D. To find the cut-off transaction cost TC
at which the profits from selling and pay-per-use are equal, note that
1
8
θH (φH−TC)2
φH
D > 0.1018θHφHD. Therefore, TC < 0.0976φH = 0.0976(φH − v
2
φH
),which is lower
than the cutoff transaction cost in the case of no uncertainty (TC = 0.0976 φH). 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 3C
Both utility-per-use and usage frequency are uncertain
In this case, we assume that the utility-per-use can be uniform either between 0 and φH + vφ or
uniform between 0 and φH − vφ, with a probability of 0.5 assigned to each of these distributions.
We also assume that usage frequency can be uniform either between 0 and θH + vθ or uniform
between 0 and θH − vθ, with a probability of 0.5 assigned to each of these distributions. This case
cannot be solved in closed form. We numerically simulate and compare profits under the selling
and pay-per-use mechanisms for different values of vφ and vθ (we assume φH = θH = 1), and . The
regions of preference of the selling and pay-per-use mechanisns are described in Figure 12.
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 4
Proof of Result 1:
Table T1 below summarizes the possible strategies used by both parties in equilibrium.
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Figure 12 Regions of preference (compared to certainty case) of selling and pay-per-use mechanisms when both
are uncertain
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Firm 1
Selling Pay-per-use Both
Selling No equilibrium Equilibrium exists No equilibrium
Firm 2 Pay-per-use Equilibrium exists No equilibrium No equilibrium
Both No equilibrium No equilibrium No equilibrium
Table T1 : Nash equilibrium outcomes when firms can use either or both mechanisms
Case 1: Firm 1 uses only selling, Firm 2 uses only selling
If the firms each use the selling mechanism only, let the selling price charged by firm 1 be denoted
by pS1 and the selling price of firm 2 be denoted by pS2. Let the profits of firm 1 be denoted by
ΠS1(pS1, pS2) and the profits of firm 2 be denoted by ΠS2(pS1, pS2). A necessary condition for the
Nash equilibrium (with non-zero profits for both firms) to exist is (here p∗S1 and p
∗
S2 are the Nash
equilibrium prices):
ΠS1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2)>ΠS1(p
∗
S1 + , p
∗
S2) and ΠS1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2)>ΠS1(p
∗
S1− , p∗S2)
ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2)>ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2 + ) and ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2)>ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2− )
That is, both firms should have no incentive to deviate from the Nash equilibrium prices.
The net surpluses of a consumer who buys the information from firm 1 and firm 2 are, respec-
tively:
UiS1(pS1) = θiφiD− pS1
UiS1(pS2) = θiφiD− pS2
If the information good is not vertically differentiated, it is easy to see that if pS1 6= pS2, the
entire market share goes to the firm with the lower selling price, and the other firm is left with
zero profits. This leads to price undercutting, which can be formally proven as follows.
Without loss of generality, assume that the selling price duo (p∗S1, p
∗
S2) is a Nash equilibrium and
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let p∗S1 < p
∗
S2, where p
∗
S1 > 0 and p
∗
S2 > 0. Then,
ΠS1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2) = p
∗
S1[1− p
∗
S1
θHφHD
+
p∗S1
θHφHD
log(
p∗S1
θHφHD
)]
ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2) = 0
However, for firm 2, ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2) > ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2 − ) is not satisfied, because if  = lim
h→0
p∗S2 −
p∗S1−h,then:
ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2− ) = lim
h→0
(p∗S1−h)[1− p
∗
S1−h
θHφHD
+
p∗S1−h
θHφHD
log(
p∗S1−h
θHφHD
)]>ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2) = 0 for all p
∗
S1 >
0.
Therefore, there is a contradiction, and a non-zero price Nash equilibrium cannot exist if p∗S1 6=
p∗S2. Since profits are zero if the prices are zero, a non-zero price Nash equilibrium cannot exist if
p∗S1 6= p∗S2.
Now, let us assume that (p∗S1, p
∗
S2) is a Nash equilibrium and let p
∗
S1 = p
∗
S2 = p
∗
S, where p
∗
S1 =
p∗S2 > 0. Because the net consumer surplus for both firms is equal, we can assume that the market
shares for both firms are equal (half of that of the monopolist who prices at p∗S). Then:
ΠS1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2) =
p∗S
2
[1− p∗S
θHφHD
+
p∗S
θHφHD
log(
p∗S
θHφHD
)] and
ΠS2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2) =
p∗S
2
[1− p∗S
θHφHD
+
p∗S
θHφHD
log(
p∗S
θHφHD
)]
In this case, the conditions ΠS1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
S2)>ΠS1(p
∗
S1− , p∗S2) and ΠS2(p∗S1, p∗S2)>ΠS2(p∗S1, p∗S2− )
are not satisfied for all p∗S > 0. If = lim
h→0
h, for firm 1, then:
ΠS1(p
∗
S1− lim
h→0
h,p∗S2) = lim
h→0
(p∗S −h)[1− p
∗
S−h
θHφHD
+
p∗S−h
θHφHD
log(
p∗S−h
θHφHD
)]
>
p∗S
2
[1− p∗S
θHφHD
+
p∗S
θHφHD
log(
p∗S
θHφHD
)].
A symmetric condition holds for firm 2. Therefore, there is a contradiction and Nash equilibrium
with non-zero prices and profits exists when each firm employs only selling. 
Case 2: Firm 1 uses only the pay-per-use mechanism and Firm 2 uses only the
pay-per-use mechanism only
Similar to case 1, each firm can undercut the (positive) payment-per-use of other to obtain
the full market share, and therefore, there is no equilibrium where either firm charges a positive
payment-per-use and makes a positive profit in this case. The detailed proof is very similar to Case
1 and can be obtained from the authors. 
Case 3: Firm 1 uses the selling mechanism only, Firm 2 uses the pay-per-use mech-
anism only
This case is analyzed in Electronic Appendix 6 (see below), and it yields an equilibrium with a
positive payment-per-use and a positive selling price, and positive profits for each firm. The case
with firm 1 using pay-per-use only and firm 2 using selling only is symmetric.
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Case 4: Firm 1 uses the selling and pay-per-use mechanisms together, Firm 2 uses
the pay-per-use mechanism only
Let the payment-per-use charged by firm 1 be denoted by pO1, its selling price by pS1 and the
payment-per-use of firm 2 by pO2. Let the profits of firm 1 be denoted by ΠB1(pS1, pO1, pO2) and
the profits of firm 2 be denoted by ΠO2(pS1, pO1, pO2). The following conditions should hold for a
Nash equilibrium (with non-zero profits to each firm) to exist (here, p∗S1, p
∗
O1 and p
∗
O2 are the Nash
equilibrium prices):
ΠB1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2)>ΠB1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1 + , p
∗
O2) and ΠB1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2)>ΠB1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1− , p∗O2)
ΠO2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2)>ΠO2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2 + ) and ΠO2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2)>ΠO2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2− )
That is, both firms should have no incentive to deviate from the Nash equilibrium prices. The net
consumer surpluses derived from buying from firm 1 or from adopting the pay-per-use mechanism
from firms 1 and 2 are, respectively:
UiS1(pS1) = θiφiD− pS1
UiO1(pO1) = θiD[φi− (pO1 +T )]
UiO1(pO2) = θiD[φi− (pO2 +T )]
Similar to the previous case, we can show that if p∗O1 6= p∗O2, then the firm with the higher
payment-per-use obtains zero market share and can simply discard that pricing mechanism. If that
firm is firm 2, then firm 2 obtains zero profits overall. Therefore, firm 2 has the incentive to reduce
its payment-per-use to a level below that of firm 1. Therefore, no equilibrium is possible with
p∗O1 6= p∗O2, if firm 2 charges the lower payment-per-use. On the other hand, if the firm that with
the higher payment-per use is firm 1, than that mechanism obtains zero market share for firm 1.
In this case, that mechanism can be discarded by firm 1, and we arrive at a situation where firm
1 adopts only selling and firm 2 adopts only pay-per-use (which does constitute an equilibrium).
Now, let us assume that (p∗S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2) is a Nash equilibrium and let p
∗
O1 = p
∗
O2 = p
∗
O, where
p∗O1 = p
∗
O2 > 0 and p
∗
S1 > 0. Because the net consumer surplus for both firms from the pay-per-use
mechanism is equal, we can assume that the market share from the pay-per-use mechanism for
both firms is equal. Then,
ΠB1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2) =
p∗S1[1− p
∗
S1φH
θHφH (p
∗
O
+T )D
+
p∗S1
θHφHD
log{ p∗S1
θH (p
∗
O
+T )D
}]+ 1
2φHθH
[φH − (p∗O +T )][ p
∗
S1
(p∗
O
+T )D
]2
p∗O
2
D and
ΠO2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2) =
1
2φHθH
[φH − (p∗O +T )][ p
∗
S1
(p∗
O
+T )D
]2
p∗O
2
D
In this case, the conditions ΠB1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2)> ΠB1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1 − , p∗O2) and ΠO2(p∗S1, p∗O1, p∗O2)>
ΠO2(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1, p
∗
O2− ) are not satisfied for all p∗O > 0. If = lim
h→0
h, for firm 1,
ΠB1(p
∗
S1, p
∗
O1− lim
h→0
h,p∗O2) =
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lim
h→0
p∗S1[1− p
∗
S1φH
θHφH (p
∗
O
−h+T )D +
p∗S1
θHφHD
log{ p∗S1
θH (p
∗
O
−h+T )D}]+ 12φHθH [φH−(p∗O−h+T )][
p∗S1
(p∗
O
−h+T )D ]
2(p∗O−
h)D
>p∗S1[1− p
∗
S1φH
θHφH (p
∗
O
+T )D
+
p∗S1
θHφHD
log{ p∗S1
θH (p
∗
O
+T )D
}]+ 1
2φHθH
[φH − (p∗O +T )][ p
∗
S1
(p∗
O
+T )D
]2
p∗O
2
D.
A symmetric argument holds for firm 2 as well. Intuitively, with equal and positive payments-
per-use across the firms, one firm can always lower its payment-per-use slightly and capture all
the market share associated with the pay-per-use mechanism of the competitor. Therefore, there is
a contradiction and no Nash equilibrium with positive profits for each firm when the pay-per-use
mechanism is offered by both firms. The no-equilibrium outcomes for the other cases (corresponding
to the cells in Table T1) are proved similarly. and the proofs are available with the authors. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 5: Proof of price and payment-per-use in a duopoly
Consider a duopoly where one firm offers pay-per-use and the competitor sells the informa-
tion good. From Figure 2, the expressions for the market shares of the selling and pay-per-use
mechanisms are, respectively:
MSS(pS, pO) =
1
φHθH
[
∫ θH
pS
φHD
(φH − pSθD )dθ−
∫ pS
(pO+T )D
pS
φHD
(φH − pSθD )dθ]
= 1
φHθH
[θHφH − pSφH(pO+T )D +
pS
D
log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}]
MSO(pS, pO) =
1
φHθH
[φH − (pO +T )] pS(pO+T )D
The competing firms maximize their individual profits:
Seller: Max
pS
ΠS(pS, pO) =
1
φHθH
[θHφH − pSφH(pO+T )D +
pS
D
log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}]pS
Pay-per-use: Max
pO
ΠO(pS, pO) =
1
2φHθH
[φH − (pO +T )][ pS(pO+T )D ]2pOD
The profits of the firm that offers pay-per-use pricing are:
ΠO =
1
2φHθH
[φH − (pO +T )][ pS(pO+T )D ]2pOD
The first order condition with respect to pO yields:
(pO +T )
2[φH − 2pO−T ] = 2pO[φH − (pO +T )](pO +T )
which on simplification yields pO =
T (φH−T )
φH+T
. Next, the seller’s profits in the duopoly are:
ΠS =
1
φHθH
[θHφH − pSφH(pO+T )D +
pS
D
log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}]pS
The FOC for the seller with respect to ps yields:
θHφH − 2pSφH(pO+T )D +
pS
D
log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}+ pS
D
[1 + log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}] = 0
which on simplification yields the implicit equation:
θHφH − 2pSφH(pO+T )D +
2pS
D
log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}+ pS
D
= 0
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 6: Proof of Proposition 3
(i) To prove that the equilibrium payment-per-use in the duopoly is lower than the optimal
payment-per-use charged by a monopolist who employs only the pay-per-use mechanism, we need
to prove that T (φH−T )
φH+T
≤ φH−T
2
, which simplifies to φH ≥ T. This is true by assumption.
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(ii) Next, consider the selling price. We have to show that the selling price in a duopoly
(referred to in this proof as pDS) as characterized by the implicit equation θHφH − 2pDSφH(pDO+T )D +
2pDS
D
log{ pDS
θH (pDO+T )D
} + pDS
D
= 0 (where pDO =
T (φH−T )
φH+T
) is lower than the selling price in a
monopoly (referred to in this proof as pPS) as characterized by the implicit equation θHφH +
2pPS
D
log pPS − pPSD [2 log(DφHθH) + 1] = 0 (where pPS = 0.285θHφHD).
We rewrite the implicit equations for the selling price in the duopoly and monopoly cases as,
respectively:
θHφH +
2pDS
D
log pDS − pDSD [2 log(DθH) + 2 log(pDO +T ) + 2φHpDO+T − 1] = 0
θHφH +
2pPS
D
log pPS − pPSD [2 log(DφHθH) + 1] = 0
Comparing the two implicit equations, we note that if the part of the third term multiplying
pDS
D
in the first equation is greater than the one multiplying pPS
D
in the second equation, then the
corresponding pDS must be smaller for the equations to both equal zero. Therefore, to show that
pDS < pPS, we need to show that:
2 log(DθH) + 2 log(pDO +T ) +
2φH
pDO+T
− 1> 2 log(DφHθH) + 1
which reduces to showing that 2φH
pDO+T
− 1> 2 log φH
pDO+T
+ 1
which reduces to showing that φH
pDO+T
> log φH
pDO+T
+ 1.
Now this is always true because, if x > 1, then x > 1 + log(x), as evident from the power series
expansion of log(x).
(iii) Finally, one can directly see from the expression pO =
T (φH−T )
φH+T
that the equilibrium payment-
per-use first increases and then decreases with T. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 7: Proof of Proposition 4
To prove that the seller’s profits in the duopoly are always greater than those of the firm that
offers pay-per-use pricing, we have to prove that (using expressions from above):
ΠDS =
1
φHθH
[θHφH − pDSφH(pDO+T )D +
pDS
D
log{ pDS
θH (pDO+T )D
}]pDS >ΠDO =
1
2φHθH
[φH − (pDO +T )][ pDS(pDO+T )D ]2pDOD
Note that for the selling price in a duopoly, the FOC is given by:
θHφH − pDSφH(pDO+T )D +
pDS
D
log{ pDS
θH (pDO+T )D
}= pDSφH
(pDO+T )D
− pDS
D
log{ pDS
θH (pDO+T )D
}− pDS
D
Substituting the right hand side into the expression for ΠDS,we have to prove that:
pDS[
pDSφH
rD
− pDS
D
log{ pDS
θHrD
}− pDS
D
]> 1
2
(r−T )(φH − r)p
2
DS
r2D
where r= pDO +T =
2TφH
φH+T
.
This reduces to proving that φH
r
− log{ pDS
θHrD
}−1> 1
2
(r−T )(φH−r)
r2
. After simplification, this reduces
to proving that (φH − r−T )r+φHT − 2r2 log{ pDSθHrD}> 0 or (φH − r)(r+T )> 2r2 log{
pDS
θHrD
}.
Note that φH > r because r=
2TφH
φH+T
, and by assumption, T < φH . The term (r+T ) =
3TφH+T
2
φH+T
is
positive. Therefore, the LHS is positive. Now, pDS
rD
= pDS
(pDO+T )D
is the cut-off frequency under which
39
pay-per-use yields the same utility surplus as selling (see Section 3.2 in the paper). Therefore,
pDS
rD
< θH and
pDS
θHrD
< 1. The natural logarithm of a number less than 1 is always negative –
therefore, the RHS is negative. Therefore, (φH − r)(r+T )> 2r2 log{ pDSθHrD} always holds true. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 8:
Social Welfare:
As proved above in Electronic Appendix 6, the payment-per-use in the duopoly is p∗O =
T (φH−T )
φH+T
.
The total net consumer surplus from using the pay-per-use is:
1
φH
pDS
(p∗
O
+T )D
∫ φH
p∗
O
+T
[φ− p∗O +T ]dφ
∫ pDS(p∗
O
+T )D
0 θdθD
Here, the maximum frequency of the consumers using the pay-per-use mechanism is given by
pDS
(p∗
O
+T )D
.
Therefore, the net consumer surplus = φH (φH−T )
2
4(φH+T )
2
pDS
(p∗
O
+T )
.
The total social welfare is the sum of the profits of the firm adopting pay-per-use and the net
consumer surplus from that mechanism.
For selling, we integrate the cumulative surplus of all consumers who buy the information good
(consumers with θiφiD> p
∗
S = 0.285θHφH and θi >
pDS
(p∗
O
+T )D
). We first find the cumulative surplus
for consumers with a given usage frequency (θ) and then integrate across θ to find the cumulative
net surplus. The total social welfare is the sum of the cumulative surplus and the profits of the
seller. For consumers with a given θ, the net social welfare is
∫ φH
kθHφH
θ
(θφ − kθHφH)Ddφ, where
pDS = kθHφHD satisfies θHφH − 2pDSφH(pO+T )D +
2pDS
D
log{ pDS
θH (pO+T )D
}+ pDS
D
= 0, the implicit solution for
the selling price in a duopoly. The frequency of usage varies from kθH (when φ= φH) to θH .
Hence, net consumer surplus from selling= 1
θHφH
[
∫ θH
kθH
{∫ φHkθHφH
θ
(θφD− p∗S)dφ}dθ]
= θHφH
4
− φH
4θH
[ pDS
(p∗
O
+T )D
]2− kφH{θH − pDS(p∗
O
+T )D
}− k2θHφH
2
log{ pDS
θH (p
∗
O
+T )D
}
The net social welfare, which comprises the sum of the consumer surplus and profits from selling,
is plotted in Figure 13. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 9
Proof of Proposition 5: We first derive the optimal payment-per-use, prices, and profits when
the basic information good is introduced at the outset and an upgrade is introduced in period k.
Pay-per-use pricing: When the information good is first introduced, all consumers with φi >
pO1 + T use the good, where pO1 denotes the payment-per-period for the basic (non-upgraded)
good. Therefore, the market fraction initially using the good is φH−(pO1+T )
φH
. The average usage
frequency for consumers in this fraction in any period is θH
2
. Between the kth and N th periods (i.e.,
post-upgrade), if the firm charges a per-period payment of pO2, then the market fraction using
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Figure 13 Net consumer surplus and social welfare of selling and pay-per-use mechanisms in duopoly (θH =
φH = 1, D= 5)
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the good on demand is aφH−(pO2+T )
aφH
. The average usage frequency for consumers in this fraction
in any period is again θH
2
. Accordingly, the firm’s profits are ΠO1 =
φH−(pO1+T )
φH
θH
2
pO1Dk−1 for the
first k− 1 periods. For the periods between and including the kth and N th periods, its profits are
ΠO2 =
aφH−(pO2+T )
aφH
θH
2
pO2(D−Dk−1). It can be verified that the total profits (ΠO = ΠO1 + ΠO2) are
quadratic with respect to both pO1 and pO2. Accordingly, the FOCs with respect to each of these
yield the optimal per-period payments: pO1 =
φH−T
2
and pO2 =
aφH−T
2
. Substituting them back into
the profit function yields the total profits denoted by ΠO =
θH
8
[ (φH−T )
2
φH
Dk−1 +
(aφH−T )2
aφH
(D−Dk−1)]
. It is easy to see that under pay-per-use pricing with myopic consumers, there is no coupling
between the profits before and after the upgrade has been introduced.
Selling: This pertains to the situation where the monopolist sells the information good and
consumers are myopic. Denote the selling price of the basic good by pS and let pU be the price
of the upgrade introduced in period k. There are two classes of consumers here. The first class of
consumers purchase the basic information good at the outset. The second class of consumers, which
is a subset of the first class, purchase the upgrade in period k. Their surpluses are, respectively,
U1(S) = θiφiD− pS and U2(S) = θi(a− 1)φi(D−Dk−1)− δk−1pU . For the basic information good
in the first period, all consumers with usage probability in the range θ ∈ [ pS
φD
, θH ] derive (weakly)
positive utility from their purchase. Similar to the scenario without the upgrade, the fraction of
the market purchasing the basic good and the resulting profits are, respectively:
MSS1 =
1
φHθH
∫ φH
φ=
pS
θHD
[θH − pSφD ]dφ= 1φHθH [θHφH −
pS
D
+ pS
D
log( pS
θHφHD
)]
ΠS1 =MSS1pS =
pS
φHθH
[θHφH − pSD + pSD log( pSθHφHD )].
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For the upgrade in the kth period, all consumers with usage probability in the range θ ∈
[ δ
k−1pU
(a−1)φi(D−Dk−1) , θH ] derive (weakly) positive utility from their purchase. The fraction of the market
purchasing and the resulting profits for the upgrade are, respectively:
MSS2 =
1
φHθH
∫ φH
φ=
δk−1pU
(a−1)(D−Dk−1)θH
[θH − δ
k−1pU
(a−1)φ(D−Dk−1) ]dφ=
1
φHθH
[θHφH − δ
k−1pU
(a−1)(D−Dk−1) +
δk−1pU
(a−1)(D−Dk−1) log(
δk−1pU
(a−1)θHφH (D−Dk−1))]
ΠS2 =MSS2δ
k−1pU =
δk−1pU
φHθH
[θHφH − δ
k−1pU
(a−1)(D−Dk−1) +
δk−1pU
(a−1)(D−Dk−1) log(
δk−1pU
(a−1)θHφH (D−Dk−1))]
Note that if the firm uses the selling mechanism only, its profits from selling the base information
good are: ΠS1 =MSS1pS =
pS
φHθH
[θHφH− pSD + pSD log( pSθHφHD )]. From Proposition 4, these profits are
optimized if pS = 0.285 θH φHD and the firm’s profits from the basic information good are: ΠS1 =
0.1018 θH φHD. From the upgrade, the firm’s profits are: ΠS2 = MSS2δ
k−1pU =
δk−1pU
φHθH
[θHφH −
δk−1pU
(a−1)(D−Dk−1) +
δk−1pU
(a−1)(D−Dk−1) log(
δk−1pU
(a−1)θHφH (D−Dk−1))]. The FOC with respect to pU yields:
2δk−1pU
θHφH (a−1)(D−Dk−1) log{
δk−1pU
θHφH (a−1)(D−Dk−1)} −
δk−1pU
θHφH (a−1)(D−Dk−1) + 1 = 0. The solution to this
implicit equation is: δk−1pU = 0.285 θH φH(a− 1)(D−Dk−1). This yields the same market share
for the upgrade as the basic information good, implying that all consumers who purchase the basic
good also purchase the upgrade. Substituting this back into the profit function yields: ΠS2 = 0.1018
θH φH(a− 1)(D−Dk−1). The total profits of the seller from the base information good and the
upgrade are ΠS = ΠS1 + ΠS2 = 0.1018 θH φH [D+ (a− 1)(D−Dk−1)].
Now, if the firm offers an upgrade, then profits under pay-per-use pricing are ΠO =
θH
8
[ (φH−T )
2
φH
Dk−1 +
(aφH−T )2
aφH
(D−Dk−1)] and, as demonstrated above, those under selling are ΠS =
0.1018 θH φH [D + (a− 1)(D −Dk−1)]. To find the cut-off transaction cost in the scenario with
upgrades, we equate these profits:
θH
8
[ (φH−TC)
2
φH
Dk−1 +
(aφH−TC)2
aφH
(D−Dk−1)] = 0.1018 θH φH [D+ (a− 1)(D−Dk−1)]
Therefore, (1− TC
φH
)2Dk−1 + (a− TCφH )2
D−Dk−1
a
= 0.1018 ∗ 8[D+ (a− 1)(D−Dk−1)]
Rewrite the LHS as (1− TC
φH
)2[D+(a−1)(D−Dk−1)]−(1− TCφH )2[D−Dk−1 +(a−1)(D−Dk−1)]+
(a− TC
φH
)2
D−Dk−1
a
. If the first term is set equal to the RHS, it yields TC = 0.0976 φH , because the
solution to (1− TC
φH
)2D = 0.1018 ∗ 8D is TC = 0.0976 φH . We will first show that the sum of the
other two terms on the LHS is positive. To do this, we need to show that:
(a− TC
φH
)2
D−Dk−1
a
> (1− TC
φH
)2[D−Dk−1 + (a− 1)(D−Dk−1)]
or to show that (a− TC
φH
)2 >a2(1− TC
φH
)2
or to show that a− TC
φH
>a− aTC
φH
.
Now this is true by assumption because a > 1 for the upgrade. Now, given that the sum of the
other two terms is positive, the first term on the LHS has to be lower so that the equality continues
to hold. Therefore, in order to make the term (1− TC
φH
)2 smaller, the cut-off transaction cost TC
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below which pay-per-use is more profitable than selling is higher than it is in the absence of an
upgrade. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 10
Proof of Proposition 6: If consumers are myopic, then when the firms introduce the base
information good, as in the duopoly case in Section 3.2, the profits of the two firms from the base
information good are:
ΠS(pS, pO) =
1
φHθH
[θHφH − pSφH(pO+T )D +
pS
D
log{ pS
θH (pO+T )D
}]pS
ΠO(pS, pO) =
1
2φHθH
[φH − (pO +T )][ pS(pO+T )D ]2pOD
From Proposition 3, we know that the firm that adopts the selling mechanism has higher profits
from the base information good than the firm that adopts the pay-per-use mechanism. When the
two firms introduce the upgrade, they no longer compete with each other for the upgrade because
consumers have chosen either the pay-per-use mechanism or the selling mechanism for the base
good (under certain conditions that prevent consumers from switching to the other mechanism,
which can be seen to be easily satisfied for the upgrade to yield positive utility to either set of
consumers). Because the market share of the selling mechanism for the base information good is
higher under competition, and because selling has already captured the customers whose utility-
per-use and usage frequency are jointly high, the firm that sells can price the upgrade to extract a
higher profit than the firm that adopts pay-per-use. Therefore, the presence of the upgrade benefits
the seller to a greater extent in a duopoly. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 11:
Market shares and profits under competition with vertical differentiation
We focus on deriving analytical expressions for the firms’ market shares and profits below.
Equilibrium outcomes were then derived after numerically solving the first order conditions corre-
sponding to these profit expressions.
Case 1: Low transaction cost (Figure 6)
When the transaction cost is low (0 < T < 0.11), the equilibrium division of market shares is
displayed in Figure 6 in the paper. On the lower side, the market share of the selling mechanism for
firm 1 is obtained by comparing the net consumer surpluses from buying that good from firm 1 and
buying the good offered by firm 2. Consumers buy the good from firm 1 iff US1(pS1) = φiθiD−pS1 >
US2(pS2) = λθiφiD−pS2 =⇒ φiθi > pS1−pS2(1−λ)D . On the left, the market share of the selling mechanism
employed by firm 1 is characterized by θi >
pS1
(pO1+T )D
. Therefore, the market share of that good
from selling is:
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MSS1 =
∫ 1
pS1
(pO1+T )D
[1− pS1−pS2
(1−λ)θD ]dθ= 1− pS1(pO1+T )D +
pS1−pS2
(1−λ)D log(
pS1
(pO1+T )D
)
To find the market share of the pay-per-use mechanism of firm 1, we note that the pay-per-use
market share is to the left of the selling market share of firm 1 above and the selling market share
of firm 2 below. The latter boundary is represented by UO1(pO1) = θi(φi−T − pO1)D=US2(pS2) =
λθiφiD−pS2, which is characterized by θi = pS2[pO1+T−(1−λ)φi]D . On the right side (above), the market
share is bounded by firm 1’s selling region, and this boundary is characterized by θi =
pS1
(pO1+T )D
. On
the lower side, the market share of the pay-per-use mechanism of firm 1 is bounded by the market
share of the pay-per-use mechanism of firm 2. This boundary is represented by UO1(pO1) = θi(φi−
T − pO1)D = UO2(pO2) = θi(λφ− T − pO2)D, which is characterized by φi = pO1−pO2(1−λ) . Integrating
out the relevant area, the market share of the pay-per-use mechanism of firm 1 is:
MSO1 = [1− (pS1−pS2)(pO1+T )pS1(1−λ) ]
pS1
(pO1+T )D
+
∫ (pS1−pS2)(pO1+T )
pS1(1−λ)
pO1−pO2
(1−λ)
pS2
[pO1+T−(1−λ)φi]Ddφ
= pS1
(pO1+T )D
− (pS1−pS2)
(1−λ)D − pS2(1−λ)D log pS2(pO1+T )pS1(pO2+T )
To find the market share of the pay-per-use mechanism of firm 2, we note that the pay-per-
use market share is to the left of the selling market share of firm 2. The boundary between the
two regions is represented by: UO2(pO2) = θi(λφ− T − pO2)D = US2(pS2) = λθiφiD− pS2, which is
characterized by θi =
pS2
(pO2+T )D
. On the lower side, the market share of the pay-per-use mechanism
of firm 2 is bounded by zero, and this boundary is characterized by: φi =
pO2+T
(1−λ) . Therefore, the
market share of the pay-per-use mechanism of firm 2 is:
MSO2 = [
pO1−pO2
(1−λ) − pO2+T(1−λ) ] pS2(pO2+T )D
We next find the fraction of non-adopters. This fraction is represented by the area under the
pay-per-use and selling regions of firm 2. The area under the fraction of φi =
pO2+T
λ
who buy
information good from firm 2 is:∫ pO2+T
λ
pS2
λD
[1− pS2
λφD
]dφ= pO2+T
λ
− pS2
λD
+ pS2
λD
log[ pS2
(pO2+T )D
]
Therefore, the total fraction of non-adopters is:
MSNA =
pO2+T
λ
− [pO2+T
λ
− pS2
λD
+ pS2
λD
log[ pS2
(pO2+T )D
] = pS2
λD
− pS2
λD
log[ pS2
(pO2+T )D
]
The market share of the selling mechanism of firm 2 is: MSS2 = 1−MSS1 −MSO1 −MSO2 −
MSNA
The profits from the pay-per-use mechanism for firm 1 equal the sum of the profits from two
areas: the region bounded by the selling region of firm 1 to the right, and the region bounded by
the selling region of firm 2 to the right. Denoting these profits by ΠO1(RS1) and ΠO1(RS2), we
obtain:
ΠO1(RS1) = [1− (pS1−pS2)(pO1+T )pS1(1−λ) ]
1
2
[ pS1
(pO1+T )D
]2pO1D
Here 1
2
pS2
[pO1+T−(1−λ)φi]D is the average frequency of usage.
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ΠO1(RS2) = pO1D
∫ (pS1−pS2)(pO1+T )
pS1(1−λ)
pO1−pO2
(1−λ)
pS2
[pO1+T−(1−λ)φi]D ∗
1
2
pS2
[pO1+T−(1−λ)φi]Ddφ
= pO1
p2S2
2D(1−λ) [
pS1
pS2(pO1+T )
− 1
pO2+T
]
Therefore,
ΠO1(pS1, pO1) = [1− (pS1−pS2)(pO1+T )pS1(1−λ) ]
1
2
[ pS1
(pO1+T )D
]2pO1D+ pO1
p2S2
2D(1−λ) [
pS1
pS2(pO1+T )
− 1
pO2+T
]
The profits from the pay-per-use mechanism for firm 2 are:
ΠO2(pS2, pO2) = [
pO1−pO2
(1−λ) − pO2+T(1−λ) ] 12 [ pS2(pO2+T )D ]2pO2D
The total profits of the two firms are:
Π1(pS1, pO1) = pS1MSS1 + ΠO1(pS1, pO1)
= pS1MSS1 + pO1
p2S2
2D(1−λ) [
1
[pO1+T−(1−λ)] −
1
pO2+T
]
Π2(pS2, pO2) = pS2MSS2 + ΠO2(pS2, pO2)
= pS2MSS2 + [
pO1−pO2
(1−λ) − pO2+T(1−λ) ] 12 [ pS2(pO2+T )D ]2pO2D
Case 2: Very High transaction cost (T > 0.5)
Figure 14 Market shares of firm 1 and firm 2 with very high transaction cost
φΗ
θH0
Firm 1
Firm 2
When the transaction cost is very high, each firm uses only the selling mechanism. The market
share of firm 1 is bounded below by the market share of firm 2, and is characterized by: φiθi >
pS1−pS2
(1−λ)D . The market shares of firms 1 and 2 are plotted in Figure 14. Therefore, firm 1’s market
share is:
MSS1 =
∫ 1
pS1−pS2
(1−λ)D
[1− pS1−pS2
(1−λ)φD ]dφ= 1− pS1−pS2(1−λ)D + pS1−pS2(1−λ)D log(pS1−pS2(1−λ)D )
The profits of firm 1 are:
ΠS1 = pS1[1− pS1−pS2(1−λ)D + pS1−pS2(1−λ)D log(pS1−pS2(1−λ)D )]
The market share of firm 2 is bounded by non-adopters below, and buyers of information good
1 from above. Because the net utility surplus of consumers who buy from firm 2 is US2(pS2) =
λθiφiD − pS2, the boundary with the non-adopters is represented by: φiθi > pS2λD . Therefore, the
market share of firm 2 is:
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MSS2 =
∫ 1
pS2
λD
[1− pS2
λD
]dφ−MSS1
= pS1−pS2
(1−λ)D − pS2λD − pS1−pS2(1−λ)D log(pS1−pS2(1−λ)D ) + pS2λD log(pS2λD )
The profits of firm 2 are:
ΠS2 = pS2[
pS1−pS2
(1−λ)D − pS2λD − pS1−pS2(1−λ)D log(pS1−pS2(1−λ)D ) + pS2λD log(pS2λD )]
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 12
Variability in usage frequency and utility-per-use
Variability in usage frequency: In this section, we analyze the efficacy of the selling and
pay-per-use mechanisms when either the frequency of usage or the utility-per-use varies across
periods. For simplicity, we adopt a two-period model, the results of the model are generalizable to
N periods. In the first period, let the usage frequency θ be distributed U [0, θH ] as before, while in
the second period, the usage frequency is modeled as kθ, if k > 1, then the frequency of usage is
higher in the second period, while if k < 1, the frequency of usage is lower in the second period.
As before, utility-per-use is distributed U [0, φH ].
Proposition 12a: In the presence of variability in usage frequency across periods, the cut-off
transaction cost below which pay-per-use is more profitable than selling is the same as in the absence
of variability.
Effectively, uncertainty in usage frequency does not change the relative attractiveness of the two
mechanisms. Recall that, under pay-per-use, a consumer pays for the good contingent on usage. If
consumers use the information good more or less frequently in different periods compared to the
expected usage frequency, the (risk neutral) firm still performs as well on average with the payment-
per-use set at the same level as in the case with no uncertainty. That is, there is no efficiency loss
from such uncertainty. Under selling, rational consumers consider their total frequency of usage
across periods when buying the information good. Hence, the firm sets the selling price to be
consistent with the average frequency of usgae by consumers (discounted appropriately). Hence,
there is no difference between the two mechanisms if the usgae frequency is variable across periods.
Variability in utility-per-use: Let the utility-per-use φ be distributed U [0, φH ] in the first
period and let the utility-per-use be kφ in the second period, if k > 1, then the consumers derive a
higher utility-per-use from the information good in the second period, and a lower-utility-per-use
if k < 1, we also assume the frequency of usage is distributed U [0, θH ].
Proposition 12b: In the presence of variability in utility-per-use, the cut-off transaction cost
below which pay-per-use is more profitable than selling is higher than in the absence of uncertainty
if k > 1 (the utility-per-use is higher in the second period), and lower if k < 1.
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If the utility-per-use is higher in the second period, the profits under pay-per-use rise more sharply
as the pay-per-use mechanism differentiates perfectly between consumers on the utility-per-use
dimension. Therefore, such an increase in the utility-per-use increases the attractiveness of the pay-
per-use mechanism. However, when the utility-per-use decreases in the second period, the market
share under pay-per-use decreases sharply because the firm is forced to choose a substantially lower
payment-per-use in the second period. On the other hand, selling is less affected because the usage
frequency, which plays a role in the construction of consumer utility when evaluating the pricing
mechanism, is known to the firm and the same. Therefore, variability across periods along the usage
frequency and utility-per-use dimensions have distinct implications for each pricing mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 12a:
If the firm adopts the selling mechanism and sets a selling price of pS, the net consumer surplus
in two periods is given by
φθ+ δφkθ− pS
To find the market share of the firm with the selling mechanism, we find the area for which
φθ > pS
1+δk
This gives us:
MSS(pS) =
1
φHθH
[θHφH − pS1+δk + pS1+δk log( pS(HφH (1+δk))].
The expected profits of the firm are:
E[ΠS(pS)] = pSMSS(pS)
If the firm adopts pay-per-use and sets a payment-per-use of pO1, in the first period and pO2 in
the second period, its profits are:
ΠO1(pO1) =
φH−(pO1+T )
φH
θH
2
pO1 in the first period.
ΠO2(pO2) =
φH−(pO2+T )
φH
kθH
2
δpO2 in the second period.
The expected profits of the firm are E[ΠO(pO)] = ΠO1(pO1) + ΠO2(pO2) =
φH−(pO1+T )
φH
θH
2
pO1 +
φH−(pO2+T )
φH
kθH
2
δpO2.
From the first-order conditions (FOC), the firm sets the payment-per-use in the two periods to
be pO1 = pO2 =
φH−T
2
and optimal profits are Π∗O =
1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
(1 + δk).
If the firm adopts selling, its expected profits are:
E[ΠS(pS)] = pS[θHφH − pS1+δk + pS1+δk log( pS(HφH (1+δk))]
The function is the same as the profit function with no variability (Proposition 1) withD= 1+δk.
Hence, the optimal selling price p∗S = 0.285θHφH(1 + δk) and the profits of the firm under the
selling mechanism are given by Π∗S = 0.1018θHφH(1 + δk). Equating the respective profit functions
from the pay-per-use mechanism and the selling mechanism (Π∗O =
1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
(1 + δk) = Π∗S =
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0.1018θHφH(1 + δk)) gives us the cutoff transaction cost of TC = 0.0976φH , which is the same as
before.
Therefore, profits under selling when there is variability in the distribution of usage frequency
are scaled identically as the profits under the pay-per-use mechanism in the presence of such
variability. Hence, the two mechanisms do not differ in efficiency if the frequency of usage varies
across periods. 
Proof of Proposition 12b:
If the firm adopts the selling mechanism and sets a selling price of pS, the net consumer surplus
in two periods is given by
φθ+ δkφθ− pS
To find the market share of the firm with the selling mechanism, we find the area for which
φθ > pS
1+δk
This gives us:
MSS(pS) =
1
φHθH
[θHφH − pS1+δk + pS1+δk log( pS(HφH (1+δk))].
The expected profits of the firm are:
E[ΠS(pS)] = pSMSS(pS)
If the firm adopts pay-per-use and sets a payment-per-use of pO1, in the first period and pO2 in
the second period, its profits are:
ΠO1(pO1) =
φH−(pO1+T )
φH
θH
2
pO1 in the first period.
ΠO2(pO2) =
kφH−(pO2+T )
kφH
θH
2
δpO2 in the second period.
The expected profits of the firm are E[ΠO(pO)] = ΠO1(pO1) + ΠO2(pO2) =
φH−(pO1+T )
φH
θH
2
pO1 +
kφH−(pO2+T )
kφH
θH
2
δpO2.
From the first-order conditions (FOC), the firm sets the payment-per-use in the two periods to
be pO1 =
φH−T
2
and pO1 =
kφH−T
2
The optimal profits are Π∗O =
1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
+ δ
8
θH (kφH−T )2
kφH
.
If the firm adopts selling, its expected profits are:
E[ΠS(pS)] = pS[θHφH − pS1+δk + pS1+δk log( pS(HφH (1+δk))]
The function is the same as the profit function with no variability (Proposition 1) withD= 1+δk.
Hence, the optimal selling price p∗S = 0.285θHφH(1+δk) and the profits of the firm under the selling
mechanism are given by Π∗S = 0.1018θHφH(1 + δk).
Case 1: K > 1. Here we show that TC > 0.0976φH , which is the cutoff transaction cost in the
absence of variability. We begin by setting the profits from the pay-per-use and selling mechanisms
to be equal to each other.
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1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
+ δ
8
θH (kφH−T )2
kφH
= 0.1018θHφH(1 + δk) (E2b.1)
Note that in the absence of variability in utility-per-use, the cutoff transaction cost is given by
the solution to the equation
1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
+ δ
8
kθH (φH−T )2
φH
= 0.1018θHφH(1 + δk) (E2b.2)
Comparing the second term of the LHS in the two equations, we note that the term in (E2b.1)
is higher as
δ
8
θH (kφH−T )2
kφH
> δ
8
kθH (φH−T )2
φH
as
(kφH−T )2
k
>k(φH −T )2 as
kφH −T > kφH − kT as k > 1.
Since the LHS of (E2b.1) is higher than the LHS of (E2b.2) for the same value of the cutoff
transaction cost, and the LHS is decreasing in the cutoff transaction cost, it follows that the cutoff
transaction cost T is higher for (E2b.1) than it is for (E2b.2). Hence, if k > 1, the cutoff transaction
cost T is higher than in the case with no variability.
Case 2: K < 1. Here we show that TC < 0.0976φH , which is the cutoff transaction cost in the
absence of variability. We begin by setting the profits from the pay-per-use and selling mechanisms
to be equal to each other.
1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
+ δ
8
θH (kφH−T )2
kφH
= 0.1018θHφH(1 + δk) (E2b.3)
Note that in the absence of variability in utility-per-use, the cutoff transaction cost is given by
the solution to the equation
1
8
θH (φH−T )2
φH
+ δ
8
kθH (φH−T )2
φH
= 0.1018θHφH(1 + δk) (E2b.2)
Comparing the second term of the LHS in the two equations, we note that the term in (E2b.3)
is lower as
δ
8
θH (kφH−T )2
kφH
< δ
8
kθH (φH−T )2
φH
as
(kφH−T )2
k
<k(φH −T )2 as
kφH −T < kφH − kT as k < 1.
Since the LHS of (E2b.3) is lower than the LHS of (E2b.2) for the same value of the cutoff
transaction cost, and the LHS is decreasing in the cutoff transaction cost, it follows that the cutoff
transaction cost T is lower for (E2b.3) than it is for (E2b.2). Hence, if k < 1, the cutoff transaction
cost T is lower than in the case with no variability. 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 13
Inclusion of implementation and service costs
In this section we modify the base model to fit an enterprise software context. We assume
that when a software application is purchased outright, an enterprise client incurs a one-time
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implementation cost (C) and a service (or maintenance) cost each time the application is used
(cs). Under pay-per-use, the service provider incurs a one-time implementation cost (S) to move
the enterprise client’s database to the service provider’s server, and a service cost (co) each time
the client uses the application. Under these conditions, the net surplus of the client from each
mechanism is:
Pay-per-use: UiO(pO) = θi(φi−T − pO)D
Selling: UiS(pS) = θi(φi− cs)D− pS −C
With implementation and service costs, the net surplus decreases under selling. In contrast,
under pay-per-use, these costs reduce the margins of the service provider. The implications of these
costs are as follows:
Proposition 13A In the presence of implementation and service costs, the cut-off transaction cost
below which pay-per-use yields higher profits than selling is increasing in the implementation cost
(C) and the service costs ( cs) incurred by enterprise clients who buy the good outright, but is
decreasing in the implementation cost (S) and the service cost ( co) incurred by the service provider
offering the pay-per-use mechanism.
Proof of Proposition 13A:
As before, the market share of the pay-per-use mechanism is MSO(pO) =
φH−(pO+T )
φH
. Therefore,
the expected profits under pay-per-use are:
ΠO(pO) =
φH−(pO+T )
φH
[ θH
2
(pO− co)D−S]
If the firm sells the enterprise software, all clients with usage frequencies in the range θ ∈
[ pS+C
(φ−cs)D , θH ] derive (weakly) positive utility from their purchase. The fraction of the market pur-
chasing the good, and the resulting profit expressions are, respectively:
MSS(pS) =
1
φHθH
∫ φH
φ=c+
pS+C
θHD
[θH− pS+C(φ−cs)D ]dφ= (1− csφH )[1−
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD +
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD log(
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD )]
ΠS(pS) =MSS(pS)pS = pS(1− csφH )[1−
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD +
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD log(
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD )]
The profits of the firm from the pay-per-use mechanism in the presence of implementation and
service costs are:
ΠO(pO) =
φH−(pO+T )
φH
[ θH
2
(pO− co)D−S]
The FOC of these profits with respect to the payment-per-use pO is:
(1− pO+T
φH
) θH
2
D− θHD
2φH
pO +
θH
2φH
coD+
S
φH
= 0
This yields pO =
φH−T+co+ 2SθHD
2
Substituting this back into the profit function yields:
ΠO =
1
8φH
[φH −T − co− 2SθHD ]2
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Reassuringly, this reduces to 1
8φH
[φH −T ]2 if co = S = 0.
The profits under selling are:
ΠS(pS) = pS(1− csφH )[1−
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD +
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD log(
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD )]
The FOC of the selling profits with respect to pS yields:
1− pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD +
2pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD log(
pS+C
(φH−cs)θHD ) = 0
The structure of the equation of the FOC is similar to what we had before if C = cs = 0. If
C = η(φH − cs)θHD and the optimal price p∗S = k(φH − cs)θHD, then k satisfies
1− (k+ η) + (2k+ η) log(k+ η) = 0
Note that the pay-per-use profits are decreasing in the implementation cost and the service cost.
Because ΠO =
1
8φH
[φH − T − co − 2SθHD ]2, an increase in co and S will lower the profits from the
pay-per-use mechanism. Therefore, the cut-off transaction cost will have to decrease to offset this
increase in the implementation and service and maintenance costs. Similarly, the selling profits are
decreasing in the implementation and maintenance costs (C and cs). Therefore, increasing these
costs would lower the profits from selling, and the cut-off transaction cost would have to increase
to compensate for this reduction. 
As might be expected, an increase in C and cs favors pay-per-use whereas an increase in S and co
favors selling. However, the mechanisms through which these costs affect firm profits differ. Under
selling, because C and cs are borne by the clients, the seller’s market share is lower than when these
costs are absent. Correspondingly, the seller reduces the selling price at the margin to moderate
this decrease in market share. Under pay-per-use, S and co are borne by the service provider –
so the market share is undisturbed for the same payment-per-use compared to the case without
these costs. However, to reduce the margin-reducing impact of these costs, the service provider
increases the payment-per-use (pO). Consequently, its market share decreases as well. Effectively,
implementation and service costs shift the boundary that demarcates the parametric regions where
one pricing mechanism yields higher profits than the other.
Electronic Appendix 14
Selling versus pay-per-use when the utility-per-use and usage frequency are corre-
lated
In this section, we analyze the performance of the selling and pay-per-use mechanisms when
utility-per-use and usage frequency are positively and perfectly correlated. For ease of exposition,
we assume that each consumer has the same usage frequency as the utility-per-use – represented
by the parameter τ. τi is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and τH (as before). From
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equations (1) and (2) in the paper, the net consumer surpluses from the selling and pay-per-use
mechanisms are:
Pay-per-use: UiO(pO) = τi(τi−T − pO)D
Selling: UiS(pS) = τ
2
i D− pS
We first compare the two mechanisms when each is used separately by a monopolist, and then
consider the impact of competition.
E14.1 Monopoly
Result: If usage frequency and utility-per-use are perfectly correlated, the cut-off transaction
cost below which pay-per-use is more profitable than selling is higher than in the case where the
two utility dimensions are independent. That is, the presence of correlation increases the relative
attractiveness of the pay-per-use mechanism.
Proof : First, we cover the intuition. While the profits of both the pay-per-use mechanism and
the selling mechanism increase when the frequency of usage and the utility-per-use are correlated,
the pay-per-use profits increase to larger extent. The consumers who adopt pay-per-use mechanism
have a high utility-per-use in the first place, and under perfect correlation their usage frequency
is also high. Therefore, the profits under pay-per-use increase sharply. The profits under selling
also increase, but to a lower degree. This is because consumers whose utility-per-use and usage
frequency were both high preferred to purchase the product even in the absence of correlation
between the utility dimensions.
To prove this formally, we first note that when the firm adopts selling, then for the marginal
consumer we have τM =
√
pS
D
. Therefore, the profits of the firm from selling are:
ΠS =
1
τH
[τH −
√
pS
D
]pS
The FOC of the profit function with respect to the selling price pS is pS =
4
9
τ 2HD. Substituting
this back into the profit function yields the optimal profits:
ΠS =
4
27
τ 2HD
If the firm employs pay-per-use, the utility-per-use for the marginal consumer is obtained by
setting τM −T − pO = 0, and the corresponding market share is [1− pO+TτH ]. The average frequency
of usage of this set of consumers is:
1
τH−(pO+T )
∫ τH
pO+T
τdτ = τH+(pO+T )
2
. Therefore, the profits under pay-per-use are:
ΠO = [1− pO+TτH ]
τH+(pO+T )
2
pOD=
τ2H−(pO+T )2
2τH
pOD
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The FOC of the profit function under the pay-per-use with respect to the payment-per-use
yields pO =
−4T+
√
12τ2
H
+4T2
6
. Substituting this back into the profit function of the firm equating the
resulting expression to the profits under selling yields the cut-off transaction cost:
TC = 0.147τH
This cut-off transaction cost is greater than that when the frequency of usage and the utility-
per-use are independent (0.0976 τH).
E14.2 Duopoly
Here, one firm uses selling and the other employs pay-per-use.
Result: In a duopoly where one firm employs selling and the other employs pay-per-use, the firm
that employs selling always has higher profits, and these profits are higher than the corresponding
profits in the case where the utility dimensions are not correlated. The firm that employs pay-per-
use has lower profits, and these profits are lower than the corresponding profits in the case where the
utility dimensions are not correlated. The profits of the firm that employs pay-per-use first increase
and then decrease with the transaction cost T .
Proof : We first discuss the intuition. In a duopoly with no correlation between the utility
dimensions, selling captures the consumers who have both a high utility-per-use and a high usage
frequency. The pay-per-use mechanism captures consumers with a relatively high utility-per-use,
but with a lower frequency of usage (only consumers with a lower frequency of usage than pS
(pO+T )D
will choose pay-per-use over selling). When these dimensions are correlated, more consumers with a
high utility-per-use now also have a high usage frequency, and selling now captures these customers
as well. This hurts the pay-per-use mechanism. The inverted-U shaped profit function with the
transaction cost T for the firm that employs pay-per-use is observed here as well – the intuition is
similar to that presented in Section 3.2.
To prove the result, we note first that consumers who satisfy UiS(pS) = τ
2
i D− pS > UiO(pO) =
τi(τi− T − pO)D prefer selling over pay-per-use. Of the remaining consumers, those who obtain a
(weakly) positive net surplus from the pay-per-use mechanism adopt that mechanism. The market
shares of the pay-per-use mechanism and the selling mechanism are [ pS
(pO+T )D
− (pO + T )] and
1
τH
[τH − pS(pO+T )D ] respectively.
The profits of the competitors are as follows:
ΠS =
1
τH
[τH − pS(pO+T )D ]pS
ΠO = [1− pS(pO+T )D ]
1
2
[ pS
(pO+T )D
+ (pO +T )]pOD=
1
2τH
[{ pS
(pO+T )D
}2− (pO +T )2]pOD
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Here, 1
2
[ pS
(pO+T )D
+ (pO +T )] is the average frequency of usage of the fraction of the market using
the pay-per-use mechanism.
In equilibrium, the FOC of the firm using the selling mechanism with respect to pS yields
pS =
τH (pO+T )D
2
The FOC of the firm using the pay-per-use mechanism yields:
{ pS
(pO+T )D
}2[1− 2pO
pO+T
] = (pO +T )(3pO +T )
Substituting the equilbrium selling price in the FOC for the payment-per-use and solving the
resulting (cubic) equation for different values of T yields the result. Figure 15 displays the prof-
its from the selling and pay-per-use mechanisms as a function of the transaction cost when the
frequency of usage and utility-per-use are perfectly correlated. 
Figure 15 Profits with perfect correlation between selling and pay-per-use (θH = 1, φH = 1, D= 5)
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ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 15
Non-uniform distribution of utility-per-use and usage frequency
In this section, we examine how alternative distributions of the utility dimensions affect the
attractiveness of the pricing mechanisms. We first analyze the case where utility-per-use is
distributed across consumers according to an upper triangular distribution function (pdf) of
2φ
φ2
H
between 0 and φH (this has consumers clustering at the higher end of the distribution, skewing
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the distribution to the right) and then analyze the case where utility-per-use is distributed across
consumers according to a lower triangular distribution function (pdf) of 2(φH−φ)
φ2
H
between 0 and φH
(this has consumers clustering at the lower end of the distribution). These functions are chosen to
facilitate comparison with the uniform distribution, as the net market share at zero prices will be
the same in both cases. Usage frequency is assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and θH
(as before).
Following that, we analyze the reverse case where the usage frequency is distributed across con-
sumers with the upper or lower triangular distribution (pdfs), whereas utility-per-use is uniformly
distributed (as before). In general, we find that the major impact on the decision on which mech-
anism to use (selling or pay-per-use) is on account of the skew in the distribution. Symmetric
distributions like the normal distribution and the isosceles triangular distribution do not have a
significant impact. While we analyze the monopoly case here, we expect the intuition to carry
forward to the competitive cases as well.
Case 1: Upper triangular distribution for utility-per-use
Result: If utility-per-use has an upper triangular distribution and usage frequency is uniformly
distributed, then the cut-off transaction cost below which pay-per-use yields higher profits than
selling is higher than that when both utility dimensions are uniformly distributed. That is, the
relative advantage of pay-per-use is enhanced when utility-per-use exhibits an upper triangular
distribution.
Proof : We first discuss the intuition. If the utility-per-use has an upper triangular distribution
(skewed to the right), then consumers are clustered towards the high end in terms of utility-per-use.
This is highly advantageous to the pay-per-use mechanism because it increase the payment-per-
use and yet retain a substantial fraction of the market. Whereas selling also benefits to some
extent from the increase in average utility-per-use, it still will not serve consumers with a high
utility-per-use but a low usage frequency. Therefore, it gains less than the pay-per-use mechanism.
If the monopolist employs pay-per-use with the payment-per-use set at pO, the market share is:
MSO =
∫ φH
pO+T
2 φ
φ2
H
dφ= 1
φ2
H
[φ2H − (pO +T )2]. The profits from pay-per-use are:
ΠO =
1
φ2
H
[φ2H − (pO +T )2] θH2 pOD
If the firm employs the selling mechanism with a selling price of pS, the market share is:
MSS =
∫ φH
pS
θHD
2 φ
φ2
H
[1− pS
φθHD
]dφ= 1− 2 pS
θHφHD
+
p2S
(θHφHD)
2
The selling profits are:
ΠS = pS[1− 2 pSθHφHD +
p2S
(θHφHD)
2 ]
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The FOC of the profit expression when using the selling mechanism is: (θHφHD)
2−4pSθHφHD+
3p2S = 0, which yields pS =
θHφHD
3
. Substituting this selling price into the profit function yields the
optimal selling profits ΠS =
4
27
θHφHD.
The FOC with respect to the payment-per-use pO in the profit expression corresponding to
the pay-per-use mechanism is: 3p2O + 4pOT − (φ2H − T 2) = 0. This yields pO =
−4T+
√
12φ2
H
+4T2
6
.
Substituting this value into the pay-per-use profit expression and equating the resulting profit to
the profits under selling yields the cut-off transaction cost of TC = 0.147φH . This cut-off transaction
cost is greater than that when the the utility-per-use is uniformly distributed (TC = 0.0976φH). 
Case 2: Upper triangular distribution for usage frequency
Result: If the usage frequency has an upper triangular distribution and utility-per-use is uni-
formly distributed, then the cut-off transaction cost below which pay-per-use yields higher profits
than selling is lower than that when both utility dimensions are uniformly distributed. That is,
the relative advantage of pay-per-use is reduced when usage frequency exhibits an upper triangular
distribution.
Proof : We first discuss the intuition. If usage frequency has an upper triangular distribution
(skewed to the high end), the number of consumers who have both a high utility-per-use and a
high usage frequency increases. Selling is ideally suited to appeal to these consumers, and gains
substantially in market share under these conditions. In contrast, the pay-per-use mechanism does
not gain as much from an upper skew in usage frequency because it can efficiently discriminate
across consumers and extract surplus related to the usage frequency dimension anyway.
Formally, the profits from the pay-per-use mechanism are 1
φH
[φH − (pO + T )] 23θH pOD. Here,
the average usage frequency is
∫ θH
0
θf(θ)dθ =
∫ θH
0
θ 2θ
θ2
H
dθ = 2
3
θH . The selling profits are the same
as in Case 1 above (ΠS =
4
27
θHφHD) because the selling mechanism is symmetric between the
utility-per-use and the usage frequency.
If the frequency of usage has an upper triangular distribution, the selling profits are given by as
in the above case, while the pay-per-use profits are given by 1
6
(φH−T )2
φH
θHD . Setting the two profits
equal gives us the cut-off transaction cost to be TC = 0.057φH , which is lower than the cut-off
transaction cost when the utility-per-use is uniformly distributed (TC = 0.0976φH). 
Case 3: Lower triangular distribution for utility-per-use
Result: If utility-per-use has a lower triangular distribution and usage frequency is uniformly
distributed, then the cut-off transaction cost below which pay-per-use yields higher profits than
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selling is lower than that when both utility dimensions are uniformly distributed. That is, the relative
advantage of pay-per-use is reduced when utility-per-use exhibits a lower triangular distribution.
Proof : We first discuss the intuition. If the utility-per-use has a lower triangular distribution
(skewed to the left), then the payment-per-use needs to be sharply lower to gain significant market
share. This is because a consumer’s decision to adopt pay-per-use is contingent solely on the
payment-per-use and not on usage frequency. In contrast, selling profits also decrease when utility-
per-use has a lower triangular distribution, but to a lesser extent. The decrease is tempered by the
fact that the attractiveness of selling depends on the distribution of the usage frequency as well –
and this distribution continues to be uniform. We now formally prove the result.
If the firm employs pay-per-use mechanism with the payment-per-use set at pO, its market share
is:
MSO =
∫ φH
pO+T
2 (φH−φ)
φ2
H
dφ= 1
φ2
H
[φH − (pO +T )]2. The profits under pay-per-use are:
ΠO =
1
φ2
H
[φH − (pO +T )]2 θH2 pOD
In this expression, the average usage frequency of consumers who engage in pay-per-use is θH
2
.
If the firm sells the good and sets a selling price of pS, its market share is:
MSS =
∫ φH
pS
θHD
2(φH −φ)[1− pSφθHD ]dφ= 1 + 2
pS
θHφHD
log( pS
θHφHD
)− p2S
(θHφHD)
2
The selling profits are:
ΠS = pS[1 + 2
pS
θHφHD
log( pS
θHφHD
)− p2S
(θHφHD)
2 ]
The FOC of the selling profits with respect to pS is: 1 + 4
pS
θHφHD
log( pS
θHφHD
) − 3p2S
(θHφHD)
2 +
2 pS
θHφHD
= 0, which yields pS = 0.1955θHφHD. Substituting this selling price into the profit function
yields the optimal selling profits: ΠS = 0.0632θHφHD.
The FOC of the profits under pay-per-use with respect to pO is: φH − 3pO − T = 0. This yields
pO =
φH−T
3
. Substituting this value into the pay-per-use profit function and setting it equal to the
selling profits yields the cut-off transaction cost of TC = 0.05φH .This cut-off transaction cost is lower
than the cut-off transaction cost when the utility-per-use is uniformly distributed (TC = 0.0976φH).

Case 4: Lower triangular distribution for usage frequency
Result: If usage frequency has a lower triangular distribution and utility-per-use is uniformly
distributed, then the cut-off transaction cost below which pay-per-use yields higher profits than
selling is higher than that when both utility dimensions are uniformly distributed. That is, the
relative advantage of pay-per-use is enhanced when usage frequency exhibits a lower triangular
distribution.
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Proof : We first discuss the intuition. Selling works best when consumers with high usage fre-
quency and high utility-per-use are clustered together. When usage frequency has a lower triangular
distribution, there are fewer consumers who have both a high utility-per-use and a high usage
frequency. This hurts selling. Profits from pay-per-use also decrease because consumers use pay-
per-use less often on average, but the decrease is not as substantial as in the case of selling.
To prove this, we note that when the firm uses the pay-per-use with the payment-per-use set
at pO, the average usage frequency of consumers who adopt the mechanism is
∫ θH
0
θf(θ)dθ =∫ θH
0
θ 2(θH−θ)
θ2
H
dθ= 1
3
θH . The corresponding profits are
1
φH
[φH − (pO +T )] 13θHpOD.
The FOC with respect to the payment-per-use pO in the pay-per-use profits yields: φH − 2pO −
T = 0. This yields pO =
φH−T
2
. Substituting this value into the pay-per-use profit function yields
the firm’s profits when using that mechanism. The profits under selling are the same as in case 3
above (0.0632θHφHD), because the selling mechanism is symmetric between the utility-per-use and
usage frequency. Equating these profits yields the cut-off transaction cost of TC = 0.13φH which
is higher than the cut-off transaction cost when both utility dimensions are uniformly distributed
(TC = 0.0976φH). 
ELECTRONIC APPENDIX 16
Endogenous choice of usage frequency
We investigate the performance of the pricing mechanisms when the usage frequency depends
on the payment-per-use charged by the pay-per-use provider. For example, in the gaming context,
if the ”pay-per-play” rates are high, gamers may play the game less often. This issue does not
impact selling because consumers buy the information good once and then use it as often as they
want for a fixed fee. To maintain consistency with the earlier analysis, we assume that the actual
frequency of usage is θ = θ− kpO, where θ is distributed uniformly between 0 and θH . As before,
utility-per-use ( φ) is assumed to be distributed uniformly between 0 and φH .
The net surplus for consumer i under pay-per-use is: UiO(pO) = (φi−T −pO)(θ−kpO)D. Accord-
ingly, the market share of the pay-per-use mechanism is:
MSO =
1
θφH
[φ− (pO +T )][θ− kpO]. The profits under pay-per-use are:
ΠO =
1
θHφH
[φH − (pO +T )][θH − kpO] 12pO[θH − kpO]D
= 1
2θHφH
[φH − (pO +T )][θH − kpO]2pOD
Here, 1
2
[θH − kpO] is the average usage frequency of consumers who adopt pay-per-use. Differ-
entiating these profits with respect to payment-per-use pO and equating that differential to zero
yields the relevant FOC. Solving the FOC yields the optimal payment-per-use:
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p∗O =
2θH+3k(φH−T )−
√
4θ
2
H−4θHk(φH−T )+9k2(φH−T )2
8k
Setting θH = φH = 1, D = 1 and T = 0.1, we simulate the payment-per-use, market share and
profits under the pay-per-use mechanism, and compare it to the case where k = 0 (in this case,
p∗O =
1−T
2
= 0.45, MSO = 1 − p
∗
O+T
φH
= 0.45,ΠO =
1
8φH
(φH − T )2θHD = 0.10125). The profits are
plotted in Figure 16, the market share is plotted in Figure 17, and the optimal payment-per-use is
plotted in Figure 18. We see that if the optimal payment-per-use charged by the firm is lower when
usage frequency is endogenous. The market share holds steady because the lower average frequency
of usage ( 1
2
[θH − kpO]) is balanced by the lower payment-per-use p∗O. The profits of the firm from
the pay-per-use mechanism are strictly decreasing in the degree of endogeneity. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, endogeneity of usage frequency increases the relative attractiveness of selling. 
Figure 16 Pay-per-use profits with endogenous frequency of usage (θH = 1, φH = 1, D= 5)
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Figure 17 Market share with endogenous frequency of usage (θH = 1, φH = 1, D= 5)
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Figure 18 Payment-per-use with endogenous frequency of usage (θH = 1, φH = 1, D= 5)
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